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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the possibility of international organisations exhibiting a degree of 
autonomous behaviour in the area of LGBT rights. It looks at three international 
organisations: the United Nations, the OSCE and the Council of Europe and how they 
respond to their given mandate and pressure from Member States in implementing their 
LGBT policies. It finds that, sometimes despite a lack of consensus, they have adopted 
LBGT policies. People in leadership positions within the organisations in particular have 
played an important advocacy role, thereby demonstrating a degree of autonomous 
behaviour. 
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Introduction 
After the World Health Organisation in 1990 removed homosexuality from the 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD), issues related to sexual orientation and 
gender identity did not disappear from the international agenda. On the contrary, the 
fight for equality and human rights protection for gay people by governments and 
advocacy networks intensified. International organisations became the forum where 
fierce battles were fought, milestones reached and set-backs deplored. 
But what role do these international organisations themselves play in the 
advancement of rights for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) people? Are 
they the mere mouthpiece of the Member States that have created these institutions in 
the first place? How do they deal with the limitations and possibilities of their official 
mandate in this particular area? And what are the implications for their legitimacy? 
These questions will be at the heart of this thesis. A comparison between the United 
Nations, the OSCE and the Council of Europe, the three most relevant international 
organisations in this regard, will show that despite the political sensitivity of LGBT 
issues these international organisations have taken a clear stance, both through their 
leadership and their bureaucratic structures. 
First of all, a short overview of the existing academic literature on international 
organisations will show that most theories look at how these organisations come into 
being, and much less at how they evolve and behave afterwards.  A more appealing 
theoretical framework is offered by Barnett and Finnemore, focusing on the extent to 
which international organisations can display autonomous behaviour. This will then be 
applied to the case of the endorsement of LGBT rights by the three mentioned 
international organisations: the United Nations, the OSCE and the Council of Europe. In 
the analysis, the findings and their implications for the legitimacy of these organisations 
will be discussed. In my conclusion, I will address the implications and limitations of my 
research. 
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1. Literature Review 
In political science, the topic of international organisations has received much 
attention. Many books have been written on them and countless theories have been 
designed and tested. But surprisingly little research has actually been done on what 
happens inside an international organisation once it has been created. The focus is 
usually on state power or state preferences leading to their specific mandates, or on how 
voting procedures or membership might influence the institutional dynamics (e.g. the 
Security Council). In this literature review I will give an overview of the main schools of 
thought and synthesise the main arguments they provide in trying to explain the role of 
international organisations. 
NEO-REALISM 
The basic assumptions of neo-realism, exemplified in Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of 
International Politics, are highly state-centred. They flow from classic realist notions of 
power, anarchy and conflict and have major implications for the study of international 
organisations. In the absence of a central authority, states compete for influence in the 
international realm, and are driven by self-interest. For power and influence they rely on 
structural and material sources like economic and military weight. International co-
operation certainly exists, but their raison d’être is based on coinciding self-interest 
among states. Waltz indeed sees “international politics as a competitive realm” (1979: 
126). The international distribution of power is characterised by a hierarchy of states, in 
which the most powerful ones are able to define the parameters of international politics 
and use institutions as instruments for the pursuit of self-interest. The United States for 
example sought Security Council approval for their military operation in Kuwait in 1991 
to lend it a stamp of moral approval. When they failed to do so in 2003 for their invasion 
in Iraq, they went ahead nonetheless.  
Neo-realism’s focus on power, conflict and war makes it essentially a theory of 
states. International organisations are treated as mere byproducts of states and are, by 
consequence, not the object of extensive analysis.  Mearsheimer for example sees them 
as “intervening variables” that do not affect state behaviour independently. Because of 
what he calls the “False Promise of International Institutions”, he denounces a 
- 6 - 
 
“misplaced reliance on institutional solutions” as they have not been able to prevent 
conflict and war (1994: 49).  
As neorealist theories mainly focus on why institutions come into being and how 
they mirror the balance of power between states, they tend to ignore what happens to 
them once they are established. Also, their focus on organisations in the realm of 
(inter)national security like NATO or the OSCE leads to a bias in their final predicament, 
purposefully overlooking organisations like the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees  or the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. They may not be a 
decisive factor in matters of peace and war, but definitely shape and influence the 
security environment in which states operate. 
NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM 
Both neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists would agree that international 
organisations are based on intergovernmental dynamics: states co-operate because of 
self-interest. However, where realists argue that they are mainly the result of the 
interests of the powerful, neoliberal institutionalists see institutions as a way to resolve 
collective action problems. They are not just instruments in the hands of dominant 
powers, but acquire a certain degree of independence in fulfilling their state-mandated 
tasks. 
If every state autonomously pursues its own narrowly defined self-interest, 
problems can arise. Creating an international organisation is therefore a way to achieve 
a “superior type of rationality” (Goldstein, 2003: 119). That doesn’t mean of course that 
neoliberals are never critical of international organisations. As Keohane and Nye already 
wrote in 1974, “international organisations are rarely optimally efficient, and they are 
frequently quite unsatisfactory” (1974: 62). The reason is that they still see them as 
intergovernmental in nature, meaning that decision-making is usually unanimous and 
dependent on agreement between still powerful states. A strong international 
organisation therefore is not so much the result of a coherent internal bureaucracy, 
acquired expertise or its stature, but agreement between rational states that act through 
them. 
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ENGLISH SCHOOL 
A final school of thought that deserves mention here is the so-called English 
School, particularly relevant when discussing the current international human rights 
regime. Its basic argument rests on the assumption that “just as human beings as 
individuals live in societies which they both shape and are shaped by, so also states live 
in an international society which they shape and are shaped by” (Buzan, 2004: 8). The 
extent to which this international society departs from a traditional conception of state 
sovereignty and forms its own institutions and norms is subject to debate. Solidarists 
are optimistic and see much room for shared norms and its collective enforcement. 
Pluralists on the other hand would argue that there are only minimal rules that states 
can agree to.  
What is important though is that the English School stresses the role of values 
and soft power much more than neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. Institutions 
that promote essentially cosmopolitan and liberal values, like the OHCHR or the 
International Criminal Court, are proof that a “cosmopolitan culture of late modernity is 
shaping a new institutional arrangement in world society” (Dunne: 278, in: Reus-Smit 
and Snidal, 2008). 
The three theories discussed above all have different ideas about the raison d’être 
of international organisations. What they have in common however is their assumption 
that their importance and influence is determined by state power, state preference or 
promotion of shared values. The international organization itself is not so much an 
independent actor but rather an instrument, expression or reflection of state action. 
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2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
By focussing only on why international organisations come into being and how 
states act through them, scholars risk to overlook the ontologically independent power 
and autonomy that institutions can acquire. To start, Barnett and Finnemore (2004) 
offer a theory that aims to better understand why international organisations behave as 
they do.  
BUREAUCRACY AND AUTHORITY 
Crucially, the starting point in their reasoning is the assertion that international 
organisations essentially function as domestic bureaucracies. Bureaucracies are usually 
characterised by a hierarchical structure, continuity, impersonality and expertise, and 
these elements can equally be seen within international organisations.  In turn, this 
bureaucratic nature can provide them both with a degree of authority and autonomy 
beyond their prescribed mandate. The assumption that they possess authority derived 
from their own bureaucratic nature is crucial: it means that they are not just “servants to 
whom states delegate” (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004: 5), but become an independent 
actor in the international arena.  
Barnett and Finnemore distinguish four categories of authority: rational-legal 
authority, delegated authority, moral authority and expert authority. Rational-legal 
authority is made up of legalities, procedures and rules and is therefore highly 
impersonal and abstract. Delegated authority concerns the mandate that states confer 
on an international organization. This doesn’t mean that there is no room for 
manoeuvre: mandates often require interpretation, and the way the organisation fulfils a 
certain task is highly coloured by experience, training, values or even external influence 
by NGO’s. Moral authority goes one step further: it relies on a claim of doing something 
inherently good and just. The OHCHR for example argues to be a neutral and impartial 
defender of human rights worldwide, serving universal and not state interests. But as we 
will see in the case of LGBT rights, moral authority sometimes involves taking a clear 
political stance. The last category of authority is expert authority, derived from the fact 
that staff members are usually experts and therefore have authority though the 
specialised knowledge they have.  
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BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY 
If international organisation can indeed acquire authority of their own apart from 
the Member States that mandated them, the question then must be to what extent they 
do so. Barnett and Finnemore come up with five (increasing) degrees of autonomy: 
 International organisations may exercise autonomy to further state interests; 
 They may act where states are indifferent; 
 They may fail to act and therefore fail to carry out state demands; 
 They may act in ways that run against state interests; 
 They may change the broader normative environment and states’ perceptions of 
their own preferences, so that they are consistent with the organisation’s 
preferences. 
ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE 
One of the most interesting implications of Barnett and Finnemore’s theory of 
organisational change manifests itself when it comes to change in international 
organisation. The important assumption is that they evolve in ways not intended by 
their creators. Both realists and neoliberal institutionalists would assume that change is 
driven by states themselves, either through demands of the great powers or through co-
operation. Barnett and Finnemore’s theory doesn’t exclude that possibility, but they 
point to the internal bureaucratic culture as a possible driver for change. Firstly, 
organisational change is usually path dependent: “existing rules and culture inside an 
organisation strongly shape decisions about the future, foreclosing some options and 
biasing outcomes toward others” (43). Secondly, bureaucracies by nature tend to 
expand in both size and scope of tasks. Indeed, “left to their own devices, bureaucracies 
are likely to craft policies that promote rational (in the Weberian sense), impersonal 
rule-governed and technocratic approaches to social tasks” (43). 
PATH DEPENDENCY 
Paul Pierson’s work on path dependency also has relevance to the study of 
autonomy of international organisations. He makes several assumptions about the 
nature of political processes: specific patterns of timing and sequence matter; starting 
from similar conditions, several social outcomes may be possible; large consequences 
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may result from relatively “small” events; and particular courses of action, once 
introduced, can be virtually impossible to reverse (Pierson, 2002: 251). This is captured 
by the concept of ‘increasing returns’: the probability of further steps along the same 
path increases with each move down that path. It follows from his theory that 
international organisations, once they adopt a certain policy or stance, tend to stick to 
that policy. So once for example the OSCE adopts guidelines on non-discrimination, it 
might lead to the inclusion of LGBT discrimination as well through this path dependent 
mechanism, thus creating a kind of autonomous policy process separate from Member 
States. 
PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY 
Mark Pollack’s principal-agent approach also offers valuable insights to the 
autonomy of international organisations. In his well-known study about the European 
Community he tried to uncover the extent to which the European institutions “will enjoy 
autonomy from and exert influence on the member governments of the Community” 
(Pollack, 1997: 101).The member governments are the “principals” who, as the maîtres 
des traités, willingly and consciously delegate authority to the organisation they found, 
called the “agent”. The extent to which the agent then is able to exert independent 
autonomy depends on the efficacy and credibility of control mechanisms that are 
established by member state principals. Pollack further indentifies four factors that 
determine supranational autonomy: the distribution of preferences among member 
state principals and supranational agents (which the latter can exploit creatively to their 
benefit); the institutional decision rules for applying sanctions, overruling legislation, 
and changing agents’ mandates; the role of incomplete information and uncertainty in 
principal–agent relationships with autonomy greater where the created institution has 
more information about itself than do others (particularly important when it comes to 
agenda setting); and the presence or absence of transnational constituencies of 
subnational institutions, interest groups or individuals within the member states, which 
can act to bypass the member governments and/or place pressure directly on them (the 
international human rights community is a case in point).  
Agenda setting is a crucial characteristic of agency and autonomy. Pollack 
distinguishes two types: formal and informal. Formal agenda setting relies on formal 
rules that establish an explicit agenda setting role for the organisation at hand. The 
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European Commission is a clear example: the founding treaties have given it the explicit 
power of initiative, a powerful tool in setting the policy agenda in the European Union. 
Informal agenda setting is more complicated to measure, but can be equally influential. 
Pollack defines it as “the ability of a ‘policy entrepreneur’ to set the substantive agenda of 
an organisation, not through its formal powers but through its ability to define issues 
and present proposals that can rally consensus among the final decision makers” (1997: 
121).  
It has to be noted here that Pollack’s approach has its roots in rational choice 
theory, and therefore departs from Barnett and Finnemore’s constructivist approach in 
which the bureaucratic nature of organisations is constitutive of the social context in 
which they operate. Pollack therefore is sceptical of two types of authority, rational-legal 
and moral, which he sees as “difficult to reconcile” with the core (rational) assumptions 
of principal-agent analysis (2007: 20).  In the context of human rights however, there is 
reason to assume that moral authority is an important factor, as is rational-legal 
authority (by relying on codified human rights standards). 
INTERNATIONAL AGENCY AND AUTONOMY: A SYNTHESIZED APPROACH 
Path dependency, bureaucratic autonomy and principal-agent analysis stress the 
autonomy of international institutions, albeit through varying mechanisms and to 
differing degrees. They are not necessarily contradictory.  Synthesising these 
approaches, one could hypothesise that an international organisation adopts or 
advocates certain LGBT policies because it takes advantage of the existing disagreement 
between states (Pollack), at the same time basing itself on its moral and expert authority 
(Barnett and Finnemore) while these dynamics all result from a path dependent process 
in which the adoption of anti-discriminatory policies more or less automatically leads to 
the inclusion of sexual minorities in those policies. All three theories provide a piece of 
the puzzle  
WHY LBG T RIGHTS? 
Focusing on LGBT rights might be a surprising choice in the context of the study 
of international politics. Some might argue that it should be left to international lawyers, 
or that it has limited relevance to politics in general. I disagree with these objections as 
human rights and politics have always been closely related. Indeed, international human 
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rights law is in many cases “the product of political, pragmatic agreement and a limited 
moral consensus” (Freeman, 2002: 60). This is a forteriori the case for LGBT rights. As 
we will see, laws criminalising same sex activities amongst consenting adults are still in 
place in 78 countries of the world (ILGA: 2013: 5), making up 40 % of all UN Member 
States. 
But LGBT rights in particular could prove to be a crucial case for testing theories 
of autonomous behaviour of international organisations. LGBT rights, or even the 
recognition of sexual minorities, let alone same-sex marriage, are still very controversial 
in most parts of the world. It’s not included in any human rights treaty or any 
international organisation’s mandate. Still, LGBT policies have found their way (to 
different degrees) into three organisations: the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR), the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE). The interesting and crucial question that I will attempt to 
answer is whether organisational autonomy also has played a role in this. 
Much research has already been published on LGBT rights in the context of 
international human rights law and its jurisprudence. To date, no comprehensive study 
exists on how international organisations advance and advocate LGBT rights. This thesis 
therefore also will (partly) address this lacuna. 
The three chosen institutions all have human rights in their core mandate or later 
adopted policies. They differ however in structure, membership and scope. Within the 
United Nations, the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council are the two 
intergovernmental bodies dealing with human rights issues, both deciding by majority 
voting. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights is the UN agency 
responsible for human rights, led by the High Commissioner who is appointed by the 
General Assembly. The Council of Europe is a highly intergovernmental organisation, but 
also has a clear supranational branch through the European Court of Human Rights. Its 
47 members are all European, although their membership is much broader than that of 
the European Union. In addition, it has a considerable bureaucracy with a high number 
of staff. The Council of Ministers and its sub bodies determine the policies  by unanimity. 
The OSCE has a much looser and more flexible organisational structure as its founding 
charter has no constitutive character (it was a signed declaration and not a treaty that 
was subsequently ratified). Decision-making among the 58 Member States is by 
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consensus, meaning that a single State can block the adoption of resolutions and 
declarations. Membership is much more diverse as that of the Council of Europe, but its 
core focus is on European security. 
HYPOTHESES 
The hypotheses following from the theoretical framework that I will test are: 
HYPOTHESIS 1 
The promotion of LGBT rights as part of an international organisation’s policies is partly 
the result of the organisation’s autonomous behaviour. 
HYPOTHESIS 2 
The extent of the international organisation’s autonomous behaviour in the promotion of 
LGBT rights is greater when decision-making is done by majority voting instead of by 
consensus. 
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3. Research Design 
CASE SELECTION 
 In this thesis the focus will be on three international organisations: the United 
Nations, the OSCE and the Council of Europe. All three have a clear human rights 
mandate and have integrated LGBT policies in some way into their policies. The 
European Union also does, but it is not included in this analysis as the EU aims to be 
much more than an intergovernmental organisations co-operating in certain areas. The 
human rights branches of other international organisations like the Organisation of 
American States, the African Union or the Arab League are much less developed and 
usually only consist of a semi-judicial body without a big Secretariat. In addition, to date 
only the UN, OSCE and Council of Europe pay attention to LGBT policies one way or 
another. 
DATA  
 I have relied mainly on existing articles, news sources, official documents, 
statements and speeches. In addition, I have talked with numerous insiders: staff 
members within the organisation, experts and NGO representatives. The interviews I 
had with staff members and insiders (NGO’s, experts) were all on the condition of 
anonymity, except for the interviews with the former Commissioner of Human Rights Mr 
Hammarberg (Council of Europe), the former Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights ODIHR Christian Strohal and the current LGBT 
Rapporteur of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
OPERATIONALISATION 
As Barnett and Finnemore rightly argue, “autonomy is not simply present or 
absent in IO behaviour” (2004:11). It is not easy to determine the extent to which they 
exhibit a certain degree of autonomy. I employ five indicators to try to uncover this. The 
first two measure the intergovernmental side of the coin: are LGBT issues covered by 
the official mandate given to the organisation by the Member States, and is there 
consensus among them whether they should be included or not? Two others are 
indicators that measure the opposite, namely how the organisations themselves deal 
with LGBT issues: first of all the attitude of people in leadership positions within the 
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organisation, and secondly how the bureaucratic structures under them deal with it. In 
addition, I will also look at the opportunity of influence by NGO’s. However, their 
influence goes both ways: they not only provide input to the international organisation, 
but also the national delegations of Member States. But in the case of LGBT rights, NGO’s 
have played a crucial role in making an invisible minority visible and can therefore not 
be left out of the analysis. 
DEFINITIONS 
 In 2006, a group of international human rights experts met in Indonesia to define 
how human rights standards are applied to issues of sexual orientation and gender 
identity. The so-called Yogyakarta principles that they elaborated have become an 
authoritative guide used by international organisations, governments and NGO’s around 
the world. This thesis will employ the definitions as stated in the preamble to the 
Yogyakarta Principles. Sexual orientation is understood to refer to each person’s 
capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and 
sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender or the same gender or more than 
one gender. Gender identity is understood to refer to each person’s deeply felt internal 
and individual experience of gender, which may or may not correspond with the sex 
assigned at birth, including the personal sense of the body (which may involve, if freely 
chosen, modification of bodily appearance or function by medical, surgical or other 
means) and other expressions of gender, including dress, speech and mannerisms.1 
IMPLICATIONS 
The assertion that international organisations exert a degree of power separate 
from the states that created and mandated them has important repercussions on that 
organisation’s legitimacy. As Barnett and Finnemore argue, “international organisations 
often use undemocratic procedures in the pursuit of liberal values, thus creating 
“undemocratic liberalism” in global governance”. If power and influence of international 
organisations is partly derived from its own bureaucratic authority and autonomy, then 
the view that international bureaucrats are selfless and powerless agents of states is 
maybe out-dated. In the final analysis, this question will be addressed in greater detail.
                                                          
1
 Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation 
and Gender Identity, March 2007 (http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles_en.pdf) 
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4. The United Nations 
1. Introduction 
  While the OSCE and Council of Europe are regional organisation, the United 
Nations encompasses all the countries of the globe. It started off with 51 Member States, 
and now comprises 193 States. Founded in 1945, it is also the oldest of the three. Its 
mandate is broad, and there is hardly a topic that is not somehow covered by a United 
Nations body or treaty. The Security Council, dealing with matters relating to peace and 
security, is probably its most well-known body, but the organisation deals with much 
more. Issues range from sustainable development, environment protection and disaster 
relief to counter terrorism, non-proliferation and the promotion of democracy, human 
rights and gender equality. 
2. Mandate 
The 1945 Charter of the United Nations solemnly declares the determination “to 
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has 
brought untold sorrow to mankind”. One of those wars brought particular sorrow to 
homosexuals, who were actively persecuted by Nazi Germany. The 1939 Law about 
Aliens to the Community provided the sterilisation of “asocial persons, vagrants, and 
homosexuals”, leading to the extermination of tens of thousands of homosexuals in 
concentration camps (ICJ, 2009: 10).  
Despite the outspoken suffering brought upon homosexuals during the Second 
World War, no specific mention is made of them in the 1945 Charter or the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted by the UN General Assembly. 
The latter does proclaim that “everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set 
forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status.”2 As the addition of ‘other status’ shows, the list of prohibited grounds of 
discrimination is not exhaustive. Although the Universal Declaration is not legally 
binding (as it is not an international treaty but a resolution adopted by the General 
Assembly), many of its provisions are now binding through customary law (Armstrong 
                                                          
2
 UDHR, Article 2 
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et al., 2007: 156). The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
and International Covenant on International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) however do have binding legal force for all its signatories, and translate 
the UDHR’s principles into concrete legal provisions. They both contain a similar non-
discrimination article, but, more importantly, both treaties also have so-called treaty 
bodies that oversee the implementation of the treaties. Contrary to the European 
Convention on Human Rights however, not all UN Member States are signatories to the 
Covenants. The ICCPR currently has 167 signatories, and the ICESCR 160. 
The Human Rights Committee, belonging to the ICCPR, is the most important in 
this regard. Nationals of states that have signed the optional protocol can also bring 
individual petitions to the Committee. In 1994, it decided that a law in Tasmania 
criminalising consensual sexual contact between men violated the right to privacy 
(Article 17, ICCPR), and also that the reference to "sex" in the non-discrimination articles 
2 and 26 of the ICCPR is to be taken as including sexual orientation.3 Other bodies with 
the UN human rights machinery have followed the Human Rights Committee’s approach. 
The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention for example referred to the famous 1994 
Toonen case when it addressed the issue of homosexuals detained in prison because of 
their sexual orientation (ICJ, 2009: 35).  
Until recently, no intergovernmental body of the United Nations had pronounced 
itself on LGBT issues. This changed in 2011 with a landmark resolution adopted by the 
Human Rights Council at the initiative of South Africa. It expressed “grave concern at 
acts of violence and discrimination, in all regions of the world, committed against 
individuals because of their sexual orientation and gender identity”, and requested the 
High Commissioner to Requests the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights to prepare a study “documenting discriminatory laws and practices and acts of 
violence against individuals based on their sexual orientation and gender identity, in all 
regions of the world.”4 Of the 47 Member States of the Human Rights Council 23 voted in 
favour, 19 against with 3 abstentions.5 Although the resolution is not legally binding, it is 
                                                          
3
 Communication No. 488/1992, case of Nicholas Toonen v. Australia, 31 March 1994 
4
 Human Rights Council Resolution 17/19, 14 July 2011, (A/HRC/RES/17/19) 
5
 In favour: Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Hungary, Japan, Mauritius, 
Mexico, Norway, Poland, Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Ukraine, United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Uruguay; against: Angola, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Cameroon, Djibouti, Gabon, Ghana, Jordan, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
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the first-ever resolution adopted by a UN body which recognises the existence of sexual 
orientation and gender identity under international human rights law. Since June 2011, 
LGBT issues are therefore no longer restricted to the ‘expert’ part of the UN system. 
It is questionable whether a “hard” mandate through an international treaty (for 
example an additional protocol to the ICCPR prohibiting discrimination on the grounds 
of sexual orientation and gender identity) will make it easier for the UN when it comes 
to LGBT policies. As a UN staff member remarked6, states who don’t ratify will then say: I 
didn’t sign up for it, so I’m not beholden to uphold those standards. With the current 
broader mandate, there is more flexibility and room for interpretation, as the rulings of 
the UN Human Rights Committee have shown.  
3. Membership attitudes 
 Among the 193 UN Member States, attitudes towards LGBT rights vary highly. In 
2012, there were still 76 countries with laws criminalising homosexual acts between 
consenting adults, making up approximately 40 % of the United States membership. Five 
countries7 still retain the death penalty for these ‘crimes’ (ILGA, 2013: 5). These 
penalties unfortunately are not a dead letter. In May 2013 two Zambian men were 
charged with homosexual acts, facing up to 14 years in prison.8 In 2011, three men were 
hanged in Iran after being found guilty of same-sex conduct.9 The UN’s newest Member 
State, South Sudan, equally retained its criminal provisions regarding homosexuality. 
President Salva Kiir said in a radio interview in 2010 that homosexuality “is not there 
and if anybody wants to import or to export it to Sudan, I will not get the support and it 
will always be condemned by everybody.”10 Interestingly, many laws criminalising 
homosexuality are a relic from colonial times. 16 of the 19 African Commonwealth 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and Uganda; abstaining: Burkina Faso, 
China and Zambia. 
6
 Interview by the author with UN staff member, 16 May 2013. 
7
 Iran, Mauritania, Sudan as well as 12 northern states in Nigeria, the southern parts of Somalia, Saudi Arabia 
and Yemen. 
8
 “Zambian men charged over gay sex”, BBC News, 8 May 2013 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
22451632) 
9
 “Iran executes three men on homosexuality charges”, The Guardian, 7 September 2011 
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/07/iran-executes-men-homosexuality-charges) 
10
 “Referendum on South Sudan’s secession will be held”, Radio Netherlands Worldwide, 8 June 2010 
(http://www.rnw.nl/africa/article/referendum-south-sudans-secession-will-be-held) 
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countries for example retain anti-sodomy laws dating back to British rule.11There is also 
a group of countries where same-sex acts are legal, but where homosexuality is still far 
from accepted and discriminatory practices are common. Examples include Russia, 
Turkey, Indonesia12, South Korea and Jordan.  
On the other hand, there are currently 14 countries13 in the world that have 
legalised same-sex marriage. The first country in the world to do so was the Netherlands 
in 2001, hailed by gay advocates as the “the jewel in the crown of the gay rights 
movement.”14 Although Belgium (2003) and Spain (2005) followed soon afterwards, gay 
marriage is no longer confined to the European continent. In 2005 Canada introduced 
same-sex marriage, followed by South Africa (2006), Argentina (2010) and New Zealand 
(2013), thus covering almost all corners of the globe.  
Taking into account these highly diverging views on homosexuality, it is perhaps 
not surprising that LGBT issues are a veritable bone of contention at the United Nations. 
At regular intervals, the inclusion of sexual orientation and gender identity in officially 
adopted documents is a hotly debated topic. At the 2001 United Nations Global 
Conference on AIDS, Catholic and Islamic countries for example objected successfully to 
the inclusion of gays and prostitutes as groups vulnerable to HIV. A Pakistani delegate 
declared that “these kinds of things are not prevalent in Muslim countries.”15  
The two main theatres where the intergovernmental battles take place are the 
General Assembly in New York and the Human Rights Council in Geneva. In Geneva the 
intergovernmental confrontation started in 2003, when Brazil rather unexpectedly 
presented a draft resolution entitled ““Human rights and sexual orientation” to the 
Commission on Human Rights (the Human Rights Council’s predecessor).  It met with 
fierce opposition within the Commission. The OIC countries, led by Pakistan, as well as 
others like Zimbabwe, argued that the topic did not even belong on the agenda of the 
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Commission and tried to remove the resolution from the agenda altogether. Their 
attempt failed, but when it became clear that the resolution did not have enough votes, 
deliberations were postponed to the next session, and then taken off the agenda in 2005. 
It would take until 2011 until a resolution was agreed at the Human Rights 
Council, condemning violence and discrimination of LGBT people. 23 of the 47 Member 
States voted in favour of the resolution initiated by South Africa. The resolution also 
called for a panel to be convened in 2012 and a study to be prepared by the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights. With the benefit of hindsight, it now seems that 
part of the reason the resolution was able to pass were the internal divisions among the 
OIC countries due to the events of the Arab Spring that were taking place.16 A month 
before the panel would take place, Pakistan on behalf of the OIC wrote a letter to the 
President of the Council, explaining concern that “the panel will discuss issues that 
relate to personal behaviour and preferences, and have nothing to do with fundamental 
human rights.”17When the panel took place in March 2012, almost all OIC countries and 
some African countries ostentatiously walked out of the room after having made known 
their opposition. Pakistan, on behalf of the OIC, argued that “licentious behaviour 
promoted under the concept of sexual orientation was against the fundamental 
teachings of various religions including Islam”. Mauritania, speaking on behalf of the 
Arab Group, said that “attempts to impose the controversial topic of sexual orientation 
were aimed at creating new rights for specific cultural values which would have negative 
effects on social structures”, while Senegal, on behalf of the majority of the African 
Group, rejected “any attempt to impose concepts or notions on certain behaviours which 
did not fall into the internationally agreed set of human rights.”18 
In New York, the first-ever UN General Assembly statement on LGBT issues 
adopted in 2008 again revealed the existing divide. There, the format of a statement was 
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used because there was not enough support for an official resolution.19 Co-sponsored by 
France and the Netherlands, 66 nations supported the declaration condemning 
discrimination and violence based on sexual orientation and gender identity.20 Initially, 
the United States refused to sign the declaration, together with China, Russia and the 
countries of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. After the election of President 
Obama, the American Administration announced it would reverse President Bush’ 
decision, bringing the total number of signatories to 67.21 However, Syria, on behalf of a 
group of 57 countries, read out a counter statement, stating its opposition to the 
concepts of sexual orientation and gender identity in international law. It argued that 
the introduction of the concept of ‘orientation’ could usher in “the social normalization 
and possibly the legitimization of many deplorable acts including pedophilia.” It noted 
“with concern the attempts to create “new rights” or “new standards” by misinterpreting 
the Universal Declaration and international treaties to include such notions that were 
never articulated nor agreed by the general membership.”22 Clearly, consensus at the UN 
on LGBT rights is still far away. 
4. Leadership 
Secretary General 
 The UN Charter only provides a rather vague description of the role the Secretary 
General plays within the organisation, calling him the UN’s “chief administrative 
officer.”23 Over time, the function UN Secretary General has expanded beyond being a 
mere civil servant. Indeed, the United Nations itself now describes his role as “equal 
parts diplomat and advocate, civil servant and CEO”.24 In that role of global advocate 
 Kofi Annan was the first Secretary General to address gay rights, albeit cautiously 
and hesitantly. The first occasion when he did so was at an event organized by the UN 
Gay, Lesbian or Bisexual Employees Organisation (GLOBE) in 2003 at the UN’s 
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Headquarters in New York.25 Speaking about protecting the rights of lesbians and gays 
around the world, he emphasised that “the United Nations cannot condone any 
persecution of, or discrimination against, people on any grounds, and recalls article 2 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which says that "Everyone is entitled to all 
the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind.”26 
He added that “we should be much more tolerant and compassionate” and “stress those 
positive aspects in our society, the things that bring us together, and move away from 
discrimination and persecution”.27 At the same event, Annan announced that he would 
treat married gay and lesbian staff members according to the staff member's nationality. 
In January 2004, the decision was formally announced that “marriage recognized as 
valid under the law of the country of a staff member’s nationality will qualify that staff 
member to receive the entitlements provided for eligible family members.”28 Although 
seemingly a rather insignificant move, and fully according to UN practice, it was 
immediately noticed by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), a group 
consisting of 57 Muslim States. Its Iranian representative Alireza Tootoonchian, told a 
UN General Assembly committee that “there is no justification for Annan's move”, 
accusing him of exceeding his authority. An Indonesian delegate expressed concern that 
a new concept of "family" had been created without proper deliberation in UN bodies. 
The Vatican aligned itself with the OIC, stressing that same-sex unions are contrary to 
Catholic teaching.29Interestingly however, Turkey, also part of the OIC, defended the 
Secretary General, saying he had respected the legislative authority of member states. 30 
The fact that the UN also recognized polygamous marriages of its staff members, even 
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allowing them to divide their benefits among their wives, 31 was apparently of no 
relevance to the OIC. 
 Annan’s reluctance to speak out in favour of gay rights is rather surprising taken 
into account the fact that he called the fight against HIV/AIDS his “personal priority”.32 
When asked at a press conference whether “cultural sensitivities naming vulnerable 
groups” like gay people should be respected, Annan answered that “regardless of their 
religious beliefs, regardless of their orientation, they are human beings with human 
rights which ought to be respected.”33  
 Ban Ki-moon, who succeeded Annan in 2007, initially started off as cautiously as 
Mr Annan. His first public mentioning of gay rights was rather unexpected and 
impromptu. During a speech at the 2007 World Affairs Council in San Francisco, 
protesters interrupted Mr Ban while raising a banner and yelling “Gay Rights are Human 
Rights”. Mr Ban’s dryly replied that “I recognize that gay rights is a very sensitive 
issue.”34 Still, Mr Ban would become the first sitting Secretary-General who exclusively 
addressed the issue of LGBT rights at a debate at the United Nations. In 2010, on the 
occasion of International Human Rights Day, Mr Ban spoke at an event co-sponsored by 
Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Croatia, Gabon, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the 
United States and the European Union calling for an end to violence and discrimination 
against LGBT persons.. Although he conceded that gay rights were a controversial issue, 
he affirmed that “where there is tension between cultural attitudes and universal human 
rights, universal human rights must carry the day.”35  
Mr Ban’s support of gay rights were not just words. In 2010, Mr Ban travelled to 
Malawi, where his personal efforts secured the release of a gay couple who had been 
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sentenced to 14 years in prison. Malawi President Bingu wa Mutharika pardoned the 
two men, although he maintained that they had “committed a crime against our culture, 
our religion and our laws” and that the release was purely on humanitarian grounds.36 
Mr Ban regularly urges African leaders to repeal laws criminalising homosexuality. At 
the 2012 African Union Summit in Ethiopia he called on African nations to stop treating 
gays as “second-class citizens, or even criminals”.37 However, his outspoken gay rights 
advocacy as UN Secretary General on a still deeply homophobic continent makes him 
vulnerable for criticism. A Zimbabwean diplomat recently accused Mr Ban of 
championing Western causes, adding that his “crusade to promote gay rights is dismal 
diplomacy.”38 
Since the 2010 speech exclusively devoted to LGBT rights, Mr Ban Ki-moon has 
clearly stepped up his engagement by using increasingly strong language. His remarks to 
the Human Rights Council panel in March 2012 showed a strong personal commitment 
to the cause. “To those who are lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender, let me say: You are 
not alone. Your struggle for an end to violence and discrimination is a shared struggle. 
Any attack on you is an attack on the universal values the United Nations and I have 
sworn to defend and uphold.”39 In January 2013 he confessed that that LGBT issues had 
also been a sensitive topic for himself. “I did not grow up in a culture or at a time when 
we talked about these issues. But, as Secretary-General, I learned to speak out for one 
essential reason: lives and fundamental values are at stake.”40 But his strongest-worded 
remarks till date were as recent as April 2013 in a video message to the Oslo Conference 
on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.  Calling LGBT discrimination 
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“one of the great, neglected human rights challenges of our time”, Mr Ban pledged to lead 
a global campaign against homophobic violence and discrimination.41 
 The High Commissioner for Human Rights 
When the UN General Assembly created the post of High Commissioner for 
Human Rights in 1993, it also tried to clearly circumscribe its mandate to ensure an 
“impartial, objective, non-selective and effective performance.”42 The High 
Commissioner had to be guided “by the recognition that all human rights - civil, cultural, 
economic, political and social - are universal, indivisible, interdependent and 
interrelated and that, while the significance of national and regional particularities and 
various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the 
duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote 
and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.”43This built-in ambiguity – 
respecting cultures and religions while at the same time defending the universality of 
human rights – meant that the fulfillment of his mandate was almost bound to meet with 
controversy and criticism.  
More than just a civil servant overseeing the United Nations human rights 
machinery, it is the (supposed) moral leadership of the High Commissioner that gives it 
weight and influence on the international stage. It allows him to speak out on causes that 
the Commissioner thinks are overlooked or need to be addressed. But moral issues are 
inevitably also political issues (Ramcharan, 2009: 202), and the High Commissioner is 
not an activist but a diplomat. This balancing act is all the more obvious when it comes 
to LGBT rights advocacy. 
The first High Commissioner, José Ayala-Lasso, did not speak out for LGBT rights 
during his mandate. Overall, he was seen as a rather weak and cautious Commissioner 
(Mertus , 2005: 38). When he was asked about his position on female genital mutilation 
(sometimes defended as cultural practice), his answer was that “first there is the idea 
that human rights are universal and must be respected. And second, we must not forget 
regional and national particularities of a cultural religious and traditional nature. So 
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there is a mutual interdependence between these concepts and I will follow the 
guidelines that the General Assembly has decided to establish as my mandate.”44  
Mr Ayala-Lasso resigned mid-way through a four-year term, making way in 1997 
for Mary Robinson, then President of Ireland. Human rights groups had urged Secretary-
General Annan to come up with a more outspoken candidate45. In many regards, Mary 
Robinson was the opposite of José Ayala-Lasso. She promised to “stand up to bullies”, 
angered the United States with her stance on Afghanistan and was not afraid to speak 
out on issues she felt strongly about. But more interestingly, she was the first UN High 
Commissioner to consistently speak out in favour of gay rights. Her track record in that 
area was more that of an activist than a diplomat. As early as 1969 she spoke out against 
the criminalisation of homosexuality in Ireland46, thereby upsetting both the political 
establishment and the Catholic Church. For many years Robinson also worked as legal 
advisor for the Campaign for Homosexual Law Reform, an organisation set up to 
organisation set up to campaign for the decriminalisation of homosexuality in Ireland. 
When they took the case (successfully) to the European Court in Strasbourg, Mary 
Robinson, at the time Senator, was part of the legal team.47 Coincidentally, as President 
of Ireland she became the one to sign the bill into law which decriminalised 
homosexuality in Ireland in 1993. One year after her appointment as High 
Commissioner in 1997 an historical meeting took place between her and the 
International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA) in Geneva.48 
According to ILGA, Robinson promised to introduce the right of non-discrimination 
based on sexual orientation in all seminars and debates promoted by her, and intended 
to establish a permanent liaison between her Office and ILGA. She also asked ILGA to 
provide information for training UN staff, treaty bodies and rapporteurs.49 In 2005 Mary 
Robinson received the OUTSPOKEN Award by the International Gay and Lesbian Human 
Rights Commission (IGLHRC) for her leadership in the advancement of LGBT rights. 
Reflecting back on the criticism she received after speaking out on homosexuality, 
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Robinson later said that “I had focused solely on the legal issue, not appreciating the 
political realities.”50  
When her mandate was not prolonged in 2002, the Brazilian UN official Vieira de 
Mello took over. He left the post however after eight months to become the UN Iraq 
Envoy. Louise Arbour, former Justice at the Canadian Supreme Court, succeeded him in 
2003 and would remain High Commissioner until 2008. In 2005 her Office’s website for 
the first time included a reference to “sexual orientation” as part of a section on “cross-
cutting issues.”51 But where Mary Robinson was the first High Commissioner to meet 
with gay NGO’s, Louise Arbour was the first to openly speak out in a strong-worded 
statement at the International Conference on LGBT Human Rights held in Montreal in 
July 2006 as part of the first World Outgames. “Neither the existence of national laws, 
nor the prevalence of custom can ever justify the abuse, attacks, torture and indeed 
killings that gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender persons are subjected to because of 
who they are or are perceived to be.  Because of the stigma attached to issues 
surrounding sexual orientation and gender identity, violence against LGBT persons is 
frequently unreported, undocumented and goes ultimately unpunished.  Rarely does it 
provoke public debate and outrage.  This shameful silence is the ultimate rejection of the 
fundamental principle of universality of rights.”52  
Her successor, current High Commissioner Navi Pillay (South-Africa) is equally 
outspoken. Three months after the start of her tenure in 2008, she likened laws that 
criminalise same-sex consensual sex with the laws under the Apartheid regime, adding 
that they are “inconsistent both with international law and with traditional values of 
dignity, inclusion and respect for all.”53 At the 2012 Human Rights Council panel on 
violence against LGT persons, where most of the OIC delegates walked out the room, she 
acknowledged that for some, “homosexuality and expressions of transgender identity 
conflict with local cultural or traditional values, or with religious teachings, or that they 
run counter to public opinion.” She added however that “the balance between tradition 
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and culture, on the one hand, and universal human rights, on the other, must be struck in 
favour of rights.”54 The tension between the two became very apparent during her 2012 
visit to Zimbabwe, where she called for the inclusion where Pillay spoke out in favour of 
gay rights. After her visit, the state-controlled Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation 
called it “stupid”, adding that “Zimbabwe is a morally-conscious nation whose traditions, 
customs and beliefs are against homosexuality.”55 
5. NGO Participation 
 Within the United Nations machinery, it is the United Nations Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC) that can grant NGO’s consultative status. Obtaining this 
status is important because it gives access not only to ECOSOC, but also to its many 
subsidiary bodies, to the various human rights mechanisms of the United Nations (most 
importantly the Human Right Council), ad-hoc processes on small arms, as well as 
special events organized by the President of the General Assembly.56 Currently 3,735 
NGO’s enjoy consultative status, and among them are several NGO’s that champion the 
cause of LGBT rights, either worldwide or nationally.  
In July 1993, the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA) obtained the 
much-coveted status. However, this happened more by accident, as the major battle 
within the Economic and Social Council was about the admission of Human Rights 
Watch. Also, for the first time the decision was taken by majority vote in the Economic 
and Social Council, and several delegates from developing countries were absent during 
crucial stages in the process.57 
ILGA’s accreditation met with fierce resistance, in particular among conservative 
American groups. When it became known in 1994 that one of ILGA’s 350 member 
organisations supported paedophilia58, American Senator Jesse Helms began a campaign 
to have ILGA’s consultative status suspended. In September 1994 ECOSOC indeed 
                                                          
54
 Statement by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay to the Panel on ending violence and 
discrimination against individuals on the basis of their sexual orientation and gender identity at the Human 
Rights Council 19th Session, Geneva, 7 March 2012 
(http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11917&LangID=E) 
55
 “Pillay: gay rights advocate?”, ZBC, 28 May 2012 (http://www.zbc.co.zw/news-categories/blogs-a-
features/19933-mspillays-visit-controversial.html) 
56
 “Basic Facts about ECOSOC Status”, United Nations website (http://csonet.org/index.php?menu=17) 
57
 “Out at the UN’, Douglas Sanders in: WORLD, 1 February 2010 
58
 The North American Man Boy Love Association (NAMBLA) turned out to be a member of ILGA (source: ILGA: 
1978 - 2007. A Chronology, in : World, 27 October 2010, http://ilga.org/ilga/en/article/mG6UVpR17x) 
- 29 - 
 
suspended ILGA from the list of accredited NGO’s. It would take until 2006 until the first 
NGO’s solely dedicated to the cause of LGBT rights would receive consultative status: the 
Danish National Association for Gay and Lesbians, the European branch of ILGA, and the 
Lesbian and Gay Federation in Germany.59In July 2011ECOSOC finally granted 
consultative status to ILGA, healing a 17-year-old wound according to its Secretary-
General.60 
How effective has LGBT advocacy been at the UN? According to Swiebel (2009), 
the record thus far is mixed. Although they have contributed to putting the issue on the 
agenda, the unwillingness or outright hostility of many Member States to recognise 
concepts like sexual orientation and gender identity have severely hindered their 
effectiveness. Most of their success occurred in what Swiebel calls the ‘niches’ of the UN 
human rights machinery, in particular the treaty bodies and Special Rapporteurs. 
However, when it comes to binding decision-making at the intergovernmental level, 
progress depends on the (changing) attitudes of the Member States. The 2011 Human 
Rights Council resolution was groundbreaking in that regard, but as a non-binding 
resolution of a UN body composed of only 47 Member States, it remains to be seen what 
its impact will be.  
 Obviously not all accredited NGO’s that speak about LGBT rights do so in a 
supportive way. Particularly in the last years, conservative organisations have gained 
ground within the United Nations. According to Clifford Bob, author of The Global Right 
Wing and the Clash of World Politics (2012), a rather unusual, transnational coalition has 
emerged uniting conservative Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox Jews and Muslims in 
their fight for traditional values. They seem to have overcome their aversion to 
international institutions and are becoming more and more professional in their 
international advocacy. The Catholic Family & Human Rights Institute is a case in point. 
For them, the whole terminology of sexual orientation and gender identity threaten “the 
national structure of the family”, and must therefore be “discredited” (Bob, 2012: 43). 
According to United Families International, also accredited at ECOSOC, “tolerance 
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toward sexual orientation requires the elevation of dangerous sexual practices to a place 
equal to traditional monogamous heterosexual norms.”61 
6. Bureaucratic Structures  
 Within the United Nations structures, there is no special unit or department 
dealing with LGBT issues. Only the OHCHR structurally deal with LGBT issues, in 
particular since the 2011 resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council. Of course 
other UN organs, bodies and officials sometimes address LGBT issues, but not in a 
structural, consistent manner. In September 2010, High Commissioner for Human Rights 
Pillay appointed a Senior Advisor on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, a part-time 
position to co-ordinate LGBT-related work of the Commissioner, but working from the 
UN Headquarters in New York. In 2013, a full-time Human Rights Officer will be 
appointed to the OHCHR in Geneva with specific responsibility to “support the 
development and implementation of an OHCHR-wide strategy to strengthen protection 
of the human rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) persons.”62 
  In 2011, the Office published a study, requested by Human Rights Council 
resolution 17/19, on discriminatory laws and discriminatory practices related to sexual 
orientation and gender identity. At her own initiative, the High Commissioner also 
published a booklet in 2012 called “Born Free and Equal” setting out the legal 
obligations that States have towards LGBT people. In addition to these publications, the 
OHCHR various field offices also pay attention to LGBT issues. According to the OHCHR 
2010 Report, many of them are located in countries where discrimination against LGBT 
persons is systematic. In the OHCHR Management Plan for 2012-2013, the Office 
announced that it would focus its work on “fighting discrimination based on sex, race, 
colour, descent, national, ethnic or indigenous origin, religion or belief, language, 
disability, age, sexual orientation and gender identity.”63  
 Funding of the OHCHR is not without problems. A third of the budget comes from 
the United Nations regular budget, while two thirds come from voluntary contributions 
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by Member States and other donors. The overwhelming majority of these donations 
come from Western countries. In 2012, the top-five contributors were the United States, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and the European Commission.64 47 percent of these 
contributions were earmarked, meaning that money is donated for specific purposes. 
The Office’s work on sexual orientation and gender identity issues in 2012 was largely 
funded by earmarked contributions from Norway.65 OHCHR itself has acknowledged 
that a high level of earmarked funding could diminish its independence.66 A conservative 
blog for instance recently accused Norway of “outsourcing – or laundering – their 
promotion of homosexuality through a UN agency.”67 
In addition to earmarked funding, the imbalance in the geographical distribution 
of the OHCHR staff is seen as problematic, with more than half of the staff coming from 
European countries.68 In 2007, the United Nations Joint Inspection Unit concluded that 
this could “result in diminishing the effectiveness and credibility of the work of OHCHR 
if it is perceived to be culturally biased and unrepresentative of the United Nations as a 
whole.”69  
                                                          
64
 OHCHR Report 2012, p. 117 
(http://www2.ohchr.org/english/ohchrreport2012/web_en/allegati/downloads/1_Whole_OHCHR_Report_201
2.pdf) 
65
 OHCHR Report 2012, p. 138-139 
(http://www2.ohchr.org/english/ohchrreport2012/web_en/allegati/downloads/1_Whole_OHCHR_Report_201
2.pdf) 
66
 The OHCHR Management Plan 2012-2013, p. 96, states that “a high level of unearmarked funding also 
reinforces OHCHR’s independence” 
(http://www2.ohchr.org/english/ohchrreport2011/web_version/media/pdf/0_OMP_2012-
13_whole_Report.pdf) 
67
 “Nordics launder LGBT advocacy through UN Human Rights Office”, Wendy Wright, Blog ‘Turtle Bay and 
Beyond’, 9 May 2013. The blog is funded by the US-based Catholic Family & Human Rights Institute 
(http://www.turtlebayandbeyond.org/2013/abortion/nordics-launder-lgbt-advocacy-through-un-human-
rights-office/). 
68
 In 2012, 53,3 % came from European countries, 16, 7 % from Africa, 15,7 % from Asia and 13,3 % from Latin 
America and Caribbean countries. Source: “Composition of the staff of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights”, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 25 
January 2013, p. 4 (http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session22/A-HRC-
22-69_en.pdf) 
69
 “Funding and Staffing of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights”, United 
Nations Joint Inspection Unit, Geneva 2007, p. IV (https://www.unjiu.org/en/reports-
notes/archive/JIU_REP_2007_8_English.pdf) 
- 32 - 
 
 
5. The Organisation of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
1. Introduction 
The Organisation of Security and Co-operation (OSCE) prides itself on being the 
world’s largest security organisation, ranging from Vancouver to Vladivostok and 
spanning three continents. But it is not only its large and diverse membership that sets it 
apart. Contrary to the Council of Europe and the United Nations, the OSCE does not have 
Member States, but “mere” Participating States. Although this may seem a trivial detail 
in the greater picture, it is a reflection of the much looser and more flexible structure of 
the organisation. Indeed, born out of the desire to bring East and West together in the 
middle of the Cold War, its foundation was not a formal treaty or charter, but an 
intergovernmental conference that resulted in a solemn declaration. This “Conference 
on Security and Co-operation in Europe” was held from July 1973 till 1 August 1975 and 
resulted in the Helsinki Final Act.70 Signed by 35 countries from the Warsaw Pact, NATO 
and neutral countries like Switzerland, Finland and Ireland71, it reflected the careful 
optimism during the so-called Détente of the Cold War. It is important to note that the 
Final Act is not a formal international treaty or agreement, and therefore the nature of 
its provisions is mainly declaratory and political.  Contrary to the Council of Europe 
Stature or the UN Charter, the Participating States of the OSCE have not legally bound 
themselves, nor does the organisation they created enforce the commitments that they 
have voluntarily subscribed to. 
The Final Act itself was based on the innovative concept of “comprehensive 
security”: security was not just defined in traditional politico-military terms, but also 
included economic, environmental and humanitarian aspects. They would later become 
known as the three “baskets” of the OSCE: the politico-military dimension, the economic-
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environmental dimension and the human dimension (Gheciu, 2008: 118). These three 
areas of co-operation were preceded by a Declaration of Principles that were to guide 
the Participating States in their mutual relations.72 The first six principles resembled 
much of the UN Charter provisions: the inviolability of frontiers, sovereign equality of 
States and the non-intervention in internal affairs all reflect classical notions of the 
Westphalian system. The seventh principle however went further, as the Participating 
States promised to 
“respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of 
thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language or religion.  They will promote and encourage the effective exercise of 
civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of 
which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for 
his free and full development.”73 
The Soviet delegation was particularly hesitant about accepting the human rights 
principle, but as often happens at the conclusion of treaties the end result was a bargain 
between two opposite blocks. The Soviets would accept the inclusion of human rights, 
whereas the West would accept the territorial status quo (Galbreath, 2007: 34).  
With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990’s, the CSCE gradually transformed 
from a small Secretariat to a fully-fledged international organisation. In 1992 a 
Parliamentary Assembly was created and the Office for Free Elections was renamed the 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), taking on more tasks in 
the area of human rights and democratic institution-building. In 1994 the Conference of 
Security and Co-operation in Europe turned into a fully-fledged international 
organisation: the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).74 
2. Mandate 
As the core body within the OSCE that deals with human rights, ODIHR’s mandate 
is weak compared to that of the OHCHR or the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for 
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Human Rights. One of its main tasks is to “organize a short CSCE meeting at the seat of 
the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights to address implementation of 
CSCE human dimension commitments every year in which a follow-up meeting does not 
take place”.75 Clearly, ODIHR’s room for manoeuvre is extremely limited in an 
organisation that is based on consensus and unanimous decision-making. As a result, the 
human dimension commitments are leading in the implementation of its mandate. The 
core question therefore must be: do any of these commitments somehow address LGBT 
rights? 
LGBT rights are not explicitly mentioned in any of the OSCE commitments or 
Ministerial Council Decisions adopted at the numerous summits and councils held since 
1975. Neither is any reference made to homophobia or sexual orientation. This sets the 
OSCE apart from both the Council of Europe and the United Nations, that both have 
acknowledged LGBT rights in officially adopted documents at the highest political level. 
As the next section will show, the Holy See is one of the few Participating States that 
blocks any reference to sexual orientation or gender identity in the official 
Commitments or Ministerial Council Decisions.  
Despite the fact that there is no explicit OSCE mandate in the field of LGBT rights, 
there are numerous adopted documents that endow the organisation with an important 
role in monitoring and combating intolerance and discrimination. One of the 1989 
Vienna Document Principles is to “ensure human rights and fundamental freedoms to 
everyone within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction, without distinction of 
any kind such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth or other status”.76 The 2003 Maastricht Ministerial 
Council, under Dutch Chairmanship, again reaffirmed the “commitment to promote 
tolerance and combat discrimination, and its concern about all manifestations of 
aggressive nationalism, racism, chauvinism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and violent 
extremism in all participating States, as well as discrimination based, inter alia, on race, 
colour, sex, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status”.77 Although in the long list of prohibited grounds 
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of discrimination sexual orientation and gender identity is (purposefully) omitted, the 
addition of “or other status” and “inter alia” could theoretically cover these as well. 
However, there is no consensus among the Participating States whether that is the 
case.78 
When it comes to the mandate, interesting parallels can be drawn between LGBT 
rights and another politically sensitive topic: the death penalty. None of the OSCE 
commitments call for the abolition of the death penalty, although 51 OSCE States indeed 
have abolished it.79 However, despite the lack of consensus and the sensitive nature of 
the debate surrounding the death penalty, commitments have been agreed in the area of 
exchange of information, making information public about the use of the death penalty 
and compliance with international standards.80 In addition, ODIHR has published annual 
reports on the use of the death penalty since 1999. 
In conclusion, it is important to note that the tension between mandate and 
practice does not limit itself to LGBT rights. Russia is increasingly critical of the OSCE’s 
work in the field of human rights and democracy, in particular its election monitoring. In 
2005, it denounced the “blatant asymmetries that have taken root within the 
Organisation” and criticised the “double standards, politically motivated and biased 
assessments and (...) the use of human –rights issues for exerting political pressure”.81 
The fact that the OSCE Secretariat has to operate in a highly politicised environment in 
which every move is carefully observed by the Participating States clearly limits its room 
for manoeuvre. 
3. Membership attitudes 
OSCE membership (although legally the term “participation” would be more 
adequate) is diverse and broad, both in terms of geography and culture. That in itself is 
not unusual for an international organisation, the United Nations being the obvious 
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example. Several factors however give the OSCE its distinctive character. First of all, 
decision-making is based on consensus.  If one state, even the smallest, does not agree 
with a certain paragraph or a particular phrasing in any of the Commitments or 
Ministerial Council Decisions, it will be modified until consensus is reached, or 
withdrawn by the Chairmanship-in-Office. Secondly, the OSCE includes even the smallest 
states, both in terms of territory and population. San Marino, Liechtenstein and Andorra 
are all full Participating States and are therefore legally on an equal footing with States 
like Canada and the United States. This inclusivity, coupled with the consensus principle, 
makes the OSCE the “only Organisation which gives equal voice to superpowers like the 
US and Russia, medium states like the UK, France, and Germany, and microstates such as 
Liechtenstein and San Marino” (Mosser, 2001: 67). Finally, there are no formal 
membership criteria: a State can join the OSCE by submitting a letter of accession in 
which it formally accepts the OSCE commitments and responsibilities. 
When it comes to LGBT rights, roughly three groups of countries can be 
distinguished. First of all, there is a large group of countries that advocates an active role 
for the OSCE when it comes to LGBT rights. In their view, the mandate of the OSCE, in 
particular in the domain of tolerance and non-discrimination, is broad enough as to 
encompass also discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity. The 
European Union, as observer entitled to speak in the Permanent Council, usually 
represents this majority of states.82 In its view, “the commitments assumed by the 
participating States with regard to non-discrimination and fundamental freedoms 
should apply to all, including lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) persons”. In 
addition, it condemns “manifestations of intolerance and the discrimination affecting 
LGBT persons in many OSCE participating States”.83 Norway, as non-EU Member State, 
also regularly makes statements advocating for LGBT rights to be included in the OSCE 
agenda, recognising the “sensitivity of the LGBT issue in many countries throughout the 
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OSCE area”, but at the same time denouncing the intolerance and legislation curbing the 
right of expression and assembly84. 
Noteworthy is also the increasingly active role of the United States in this dossier. 
Although officials during the Bush Administration remained silent at the OSCE about 
LGBT rights, that has changed with the Obama Presidency. In 2009 it urged “redoubled 
efforts to combat discrimination based on religion, race, gender, national origin, sexual 
orientation, gender identity, or disability”85, and in January 2013 it stated to be “deeply 
concerned about proposed national legislation in Russia that would reportedly restrict 
freedoms of expression and assembly for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) 
individuals, and indeed all Russians”, calling on Russia to “fulfill its OSCE 
commitments”.86 
Then there is a small group of States that keep silent about LGBT rights: they 
neither sign statements in favour, nor do they explicitly speak out against them. 
Turkey87 and most of the former Soviet Republics in Asia are a case in point here. Most 
interestingly, the two remaining OSCE States that still criminalise homosexuality – 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan – also belong to this “quiet” group.88 Many people in these 
predominantly Islamic societies still regard homosexuality as undesirable and 
objectionable. As recently as 2012, the leader of the People’s Movement of Uzbekistan, 
Muhammad Salih, spoke out in favour of a “civilised way of isolating gays and other sick 
members of society so that they could not infect healthy people with their disease”.89 
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The third group of countries is even smaller, but increasingly vocal in their 
opposition to LGBT rights being included in the OSCE agenda in any fashion. The 
opposition is led by the Holy See, which is in a unique position in this regard.90 Contrary 
to the Council of Europe or the United Nations – and indeed many other international 
organisations – it is a full OSCE member.91 This allows it to not only participate in all 
meetings at the highest level, but also to block any proposal that it disagrees with. It has 
regularly expressed the view that “so called “sexual orientation” or LGBT issues do not 
belong to the area of competence of the OSCE agenda. There is no consensus among 
participating States on these topics and no commitments in this regard, even if some are 
repeatedly trying to force our Organisation to deal with it. Hence, the Holy See will not 
accept to discuss these issues.92 A former OSCE staff member confirms the stubborn 
rejection by the Holy See of any document mentioning sexual orientation, with the 
acquiescence of some other countries. Their diplomats are usually extremely well 
prepared, know how to present their view well, and impress other Participating States 
with their rhetorically compelling contributions.93  
The fact that a State as small as the Holy See is able to block inclusion of sexual 
orientation or gender identity in the OSCE commitments due to the consensus principle 
causes a lot of frustration, not only with other Participating States but also staff 
members themselves.94 As the OSCE Secretary-General Mr Lamberto Zannier recently 
remarked, the consensus principle “strengthens in a way those countries that don’t have 
any other way of putting their agenda on the table and making sure that everybody 
listens to them. I find that healthy and so I like it”. However he went on to say that 
“sometimes we have the feeling that out of frustration there is too much hijacking the 
agenda, including by some of the small players, creating frustrations for everybody”.95 
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Although the Holy See has been the most vocal in its opposition, Russia 
increasingly aligns itself with it. When other States recently criticised a proposed bill 
that would prohibit the “promotion” of homosexuality among minors, the Russian 
delegation responded by pointing out that “there is no mention of the concepts of 
“sexual orientation” or “gender identity” in universal international agreements or in the 
OSCE commitments. The calls on Russia to implement certain commitments in this area 
are therefore unfounded”. In addition, it stressed that it “shall continue to rely on 
traditional and moral values, which prevail not only in Russian society but also in the 
societies of other OSCE Participating States”. 96 Moldova has expressed the same view, 
stating that “we consider that this topic does not belong to the OSCE agenda and it could 
be discussed in the framework of other international fora”.97 
4. Leadership 
While the intergovernmental side of the OSCE is reflected in both the official 
mandate and the positions taken by the Participating States within the Ministerial and 
Permanent Councils, the bureaucratic side of the Organisation equally deserves 
attention. Although the consensus principle is the OSCE’s corner stone, some parts of the 
organisation display a relative degree of autonomy. As Bloed argues, the Chairman-in-
Office, the ODIHR, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Representative on 
Freedom of the Media and long-duration field presences are not “(fully) subject to the 
consensus principle” (2009: 553). How does that play out when it comes to the issue of 
LGBT rights within the Organisation? First we will look at the role of people in 
leadership positions within the Organisation, before we turn to the bureaucratic 
structures themselves.  
OSCE Secretary-General 
Unlike the Secretary-Generals of the Council of Europe or the United Nations, the 
successive Secretary-Generals of the OSCE to date have never spoken out publicly in 
favour of LGBT rights. His role however is more restricted than that of his counterparts. 
When the post was created, it was established that the Secretary-General “will derive 
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his/her authority from the collective decisions of the participating States and will act 
under the guidance of the Chairman-in-Office”.98 This of course does not prevent him 
from raising LGBT issues in private conversations with government officials or NGO 
representatives, but as the representative of the Chairperson-in-Office and the OSCE’s 
Chief Administrative Officer his public advocacy role is very limited. A more flexible, 
broader interpretation of his mandate could meet with the resistance of the 
Participating States. 
Chairmanship-in-Office 
Since 1991, the rotating Chairmanship-in-Office is assumed by a Participating 
State who then chairs the Permanent and Ministerial Councils. In that capacity it can 
influence the agenda and set priorities, but in the end a lot depends on whether 
consensus can be reached. In addition, as the OSCE is first and foremost a security 
organisation, most Chairmanships will focus on security-related activities. Even during 
the Chairmanship of the Netherlands in 2003, which two years earlier had been the first 
country in the world to introduce same-sex marriage, LGBT issues did not figure among 
the priorities and were not mentioned in the final report.99New challenges have also 
appeared on the agenda recently, like human trafficking, terrorism and internet 
freedom. 
As the 2012 Irish Chairmanship-in-Office experienced, progress in the so-called 
Human Dimension is particularly challenging. At the end of the Dublin Ministerial 
Council, where no agreement could be reached to strengthen the Human Dimension100, 
the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Eamon Gilmore concluded that the 
“failure to agree any decisions in the human dimension is a matter of regret to me and 
reconfirms a worrying trend of recent Ministerial Councils”, adding that “respect for 
basic human rights and fundamental freedoms is currently under great threat in many 
parts of the OSCE region”. He went then on to assure his counterparts that he would 
                                                          
98
 Decision taken at the Third Ministerial Council Meeting, Stockholm, 14-15 December 1992 
(http://www.osce.org/mc/40342) 
99
 Report of the Chairman-in-Office, OSCE 2003 (http://www.osce.org/secretariat/13587) 
100
 According to the Irish Times, just over 50 States supported the Irish proposals (“OSCE summit ends with few 
strides in “human dimension”, Irish Times, 8 December 2012) 
- 41 - 
 
“work tirelessly to (...) combat discrimination of all kinds, including discrimination 
against our LGBT fellow citizens”.101 
There is another way however in which the Chairmanship can exert some 
influence: the appointment of Personal Representatives. In their report to the 
Permanent Council they enjoy a relative freedom. The Irish Chairmanship for example 
appointed Judge Catherine McGuinness as the Personal Representative on Combating 
Racism, Xenophobia and Discrimination, also focusing on Intolerance and 
Discrimination against Christians and Members of Other Religions102, who from the 
outset was clear that she was “committed to combating all forms of racism, xenophobia, 
and discrimination, including (...) bias against LGBT persons”. She implicitly criticised 
Ukraine and Russia for promulgating legislation which “risks criminalising legitimate 
speech and has the effect of legalising discrimination against LGBT persons”.103 It 
remains to be seen whether the new Personal Representative appointed by the current 
Ukrainian Chairmanship will include LGBT discrimination in her report. 
Director of ODIHR 
Although the highest official at the OSCE in charge of Human Rights, the position 
of Director of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights is much different 
than that of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe or the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. Its leadership and advocacy role is much more limited 
due to the consensus principle and the circumscribed mandate of ODIHR itself. Still, the 
first ODIHR Director, Luchino Cortese, already mentioned the importance of combating 
discrimination based on sexual orientation as part of democratic institution building as 
early as 1994.104 Christian Strohal105, who served as ODIHR Director from March 2003 
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to June 2008, also deserves special mention here. Under his leadership, a fully-fledged 
Human Right Department was created, as well as the Tolerance and Non-discrimination 
Department. Mr Strohal, who in his farewell speech called the function of ODIHR 
Director “the most exciting function in the world of human rights”106, alluded regularly 
to sexual orientation in his speeches. At the OSCE Conference on Anti-Semitism and on 
Other Forms of Intolerance at Cordoba in 2005 he stressed that “the OSCE recognizes 
that intolerance and exclusion are not the sole burden of ethnic minorities. Intolerance 
(…) affects individuals on the grounds of their religion or belief, their background or 
status, their sexual orientation or their particular abilities”.107 He further illustrated his 
remarks by describing an incident of “gay-bashing” where someone was severely beaten 
while walking hand-in-hand with his boyfriend.  
5. NGO Participation 
NGO participation within the OSCE is very limited, particularly when compared 
with the Council of Europe or the United Nations. The only meeting where they are 
entitled to contribute to the discussion is the annual Human Dimension Implementation 
Meeting in Vienna, a forum where OSCE participating States discuss the implementation 
of human dimension commitments that were adopted by consensus at prior OSCE 
Summits or Ministerial Meetings. The European branch of the International Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA), but also national organisations like 
COC Netherlands, usually make a number of interventions during the meeting’s relevant 
sessions, focusing for example on Gay Prides as part of freedom of assembly and 
expression, or the fact that Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan still criminalise 
homosexuality. Increasingly, NGO’s that are critical of LGBT rights also express their 
negative stance. In 2010, the American evangelical organisation Redeemed Lives 
organised a side-event to the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting in which it 
advocated that the rights of people with unwanted same-sex attractions to receive 
treatment from therapists who hold to their same convictions were in danger.108 In 2012 
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the International Federation for Therapeutic Choice (IFTC) recommended Participating 
States to “condemn intolerance and discrimination against sexual minorities who freely 
choose help in order to overcome or diminish their unwanted sexual attractions, 
orientation, behaviors, and/or identity”.109  
6. Bureaucratic Structures  
ODIHR 
Despite the politicised debate around the reach of the mandate, the opposition by 
some States and the consensus principle, ODIHR tried to push LGBT issues forward in 
two regards110. The first was the creation of a Tolerance and Non-Discrimination 
Department, which subsequently included discrimination based on sexual orientation in 
its working definition of “hate crime”. Officially mandated to “follow closely (…) 
incidents motivated by racism, xenophobia, or related intolerance, including against 
Muslims, and anti-Semitism in the OSCE area making use of all reliable information 
available”111, the office decided to also include incidents based on homophobia. It judged 
that discrimination based on sexual orientation was a fundamental element of hate 
crime, and could not be left out112, also because some Participating States reported 
specifically on this category of hate crime. 
 Secondly, homophobia was included as a “key issue” within the newly created 
Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Information System (TANDIS).113 It provides an 
overview of international standards and commitments, documents and publications, 
practices and initiatives, and links to relevant websites focusing on homophobia. Its 
main focus is hate motivated violence against LGBT persons, but the section also 
includes educational resources, tools and manuals to help counter general intolerance 
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against LGBTs. The Holy See objected to the inclusion of homophobia in the TANDIS 
system, but they acquiesced when ODIHR staff members showed that “Intolerance 
against Christians” was also included as a key issue.114 In 2011 and 2012, the German 
evangelical organisation Wuestenstrom called for a specific category to be added in 
TANDIS on discrimination of “Christians who seek help with unwanted same-sex 
attraction”.115 
Field Missions 
Interestingly, field missions enjoy a considerable degree of freedom, mainly due 
to their small and ad-hoc structure, limited visibility and their geographical distance 
from the Vienna headquarters. In some of the field offices, the protection of LGBT rights 
is mainstreamed within its activities.116 When the second ever Gay Pride was planned in 
October 2010 in Belgrade, the Head of the OSCE’s field office Daiana Serafina called it a 
test of Serbia’s maturity as a democracy.117 Sometimes the OSCE mission is the only 
international office where LGBT activists can find a place of safety, especially in the 
former Soviet Republics. On occasion, OSCE missions serve as venue for roundtables or 
meetings related to for example the International Day against Homophobia (IDAHO).118 
Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE 
Although the Parliamentary Assembly, located in Copenhagen, is a somewhat 
separate body within the general structure of the OSCE and has a strictly advisory 
role119, its resolutions can serve as pressure on both the Participating States and the 
Secretariat. To date, it has spoken out twice about LGBT rights. In 1995 it called on the 
Participating States to ensure that there “be no subordination, explicit or implied, on the 
basis of ethnicity, race, colour, language, religion, sex, sexual orientation, national or 
social origin or belonging to a minority”.120 In 2010, it condemned “any incitement to 
hatred and any discriminatory or abusive statement against LGBT persons or groups” 
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and called on States to “adopt legislation banning any form of discrimination on grounds 
of sexual orientation or gender identity”.121 In addition, in 2012 President of the 
Assembly Petros Efthymiou called on the OSCE participating States to “recommit 
themselves to the constant fight against discrimination and all acts of hate, whether they 
target one for their ethnicity, religion, race or sexual orientation”122 during a wreath 
laying ceremony at Yad Vashem.
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6. The Council of Europe 
1. Introduction 
In May 1949 the Treaty of London created the Council of Europe, headquartered 
in Strasbourg, France, with the aim to “achieve a greater unity between its members for 
the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their 
common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress.”123 With ensuring 
respect for fundamental freedoms, democracy and human rights as its core principle, it 
gradually expanded in scope, membership and importance. Originally signed by only ten 
States, its current 47 Member States cover all of Europe except Belarus. 
Unlike the OSCE, its human rights machinery is highly developed and forms the 
core of the organisation. In particular the European Court of Human Rights, tasked with 
interpreting and ensuring the observance of the 1950 Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, has been influential through its judgements 
that are binding upon all Member States. In addition, the Council of Europe has drafted 
numerous standards laid down in more than 200 Conventions, although they only bind 
the Member States who ratified them.  
2. Mandate 
As a strictly intergovernmental organisation, the Council’s principal mandate 
comes from both its Statute and the Committee of Ministers as its principal decision-
making body.  The European Convention for Human Rights and the Court’s 
interpretation can be seen as the legal underpinning of the organisation, as all 47 
Member States are bound by the Convention and the Court’s rulings. Technically 
however the Convention is separate from the Council and its Secretariat.  
When it comes to the 1949 Statue of the Council, it does not mention any specific 
human rights categories. According to Article 15, it is up to the Committee of Ministers 
to “consider the action required to further the aim of the Council of Europe, including 
the conclusion of conventions or agreements and the adoption by governments of a 
common policy with regard to particular matters.” It will therefore be of most interest 
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for the purpose of this thesis to focus on the Convention for Human Rights and the 
Committee of Ministers. 
The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) 
Although it is not legally required, it has become customary to require the 
acceptance of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(1950) by any country who wants to join the Council of Europe.124 In that sense, one 
could perhaps consider the European Convention a de facto constitutional document 
laying down the human rights principles that the organisation seeks to uphold. The 
contentious issue of how subsequently to interpret the scope and reach of the human 
rights provisions has been solved within the Council of Europe by the creation of the 
European Court of Human Rights. It is the Court which interprets and applies the 
Convention, and the Member States “undertake to abide by the final judgment.» The 
Committee of Ministers’ role in turn is to “supervise its execution” (Article 46). By 
conferring the task of interpreting the reach and scope of the European human rights 
provisions, the Member States have avoided the politicised discussions that take place at 
the OSCE or the United Nations. In that sense, the Court rulings become part of the 
human rights acquis in all the Member States, and indirectly also the Council of Europe 
itself.  
 The rulings of the European Court of Human Rights are legally separate from the 
Council of Europe’s mandate, and are only binding upon the individual signatories to the 
Convention. The fact that the Court in 1981 ruled in the famous Dudgeon v. United 
Kingdom case that the criminalisation of homosexuality in Northern Ireland125 infringes 
upon the right to privacy (Article 8 of the Convention) in principle meant that all other 
Member States with a similar provision in their Criminal Code also had to change their 
legislation. With this landmark case, the Court was the first international body to rule 
that laws criminalising same-sex conduct between consenting adults violate human 
rights. In subsequent rulings, the Court elaborated and developed its reasoning. In 
Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal for example, it explicitly affirmed sexual orientation 
as a prohibited ground of discrimination within the meaning of Article 14 of the 
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Convention. Article 14 states that “the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in 
this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, 
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association 
with a national minority, property, birth or other status.” According to the Court, “the list 
set out in that provision is illustrative and not exhaustive, as is shown by the words ‘any 
ground such as’ (in French ‘notamment’)” (ICJ, 2009: 37). 
Although the Court’s rulings are in essence a judicial mechanism, the fact that the 
Committee of Ministers has to ensure its rulings are effectively carried out within the 
national jurisdictions of the Member States gives it a clear intergovernmental character 
as well. An example is the case of Alekseyev v. Rusia in 2010 – the first LGBT case 
against Russia – in which the Court found that it had violated inter alia the freedom of 
association and the prohibition of discrimination by refusing Mr Alekseyev to hold gay-
pride marches in Moscow in 2006, 2007 and 2008.126 The execution of the judgment was 
placed by the Committee of Ministers under “enhanced supervision” and as a 
consequence the subject of close scrutiny. Clothed in diplomatic language, it noted that 
“the domestic remedy referred to by the authorities might not provide adequate redress 
in all circumstances” and expressed “concerns as regards the use of regional laws 
prohibiting propaganda of homosexuality among minors.”127 In March 2013 it conveyed 
its serious concerns regarding the pending bill regarding prohibition of the "promotion 
of homosexuality" at federal level, adding that the “adoption of such a law could raise 
serious questions as to the compliance by the Russian Federation with its obligations 
under Article 46 of the Convention.”128  
It should be noted that there is not explicit anti-discrimination provision when it 
comes to sexual orientation or gender identity in the Convention129. In 2000, an 
additional Protocol was adopted with a more general prohibition of discrimination, but 
again without explicit reference to LGBT rights. ILGA-Europe, who argued that “their 
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explicit mention in the list of grounds would constitute a symbolic declaration of the 
greatest importance”130, lobbied unsuccessfully to have them included. The Explanatory 
Report argued that inclusion was not necessary since the list of non-discrimination 
ground is not exhaustive, and the inclusion of any particular additional ground “might 
give rise to unwarranted a contrario interpretations as regards discrimination based on 
grounds not so included.” In addition, it pointed to the fact that the Court had already 
applied Article 14 to cases of discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender 
identity. 131 The additional protocol is ratified by only18 countries, less than half of the 
Member States. Among the countries that have not ratified are the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, Turkey and Russia. 
Committee of Ministers 
 The Committee decides – in principle by unanimity132 – on the budget and the 
policies that are carried out by the Secretariat, and has therefore a pivotal role. The 
Committee of Ministers was more or less forced to debate the discrimination of 
homosexuals for the first time in 1981 when it had to formulate a reaction to 
Recommendation 924 and Resolution 756 on this topic adopted by the Parliamentary 
Assembly, inter alia calling for the decriminalisation of homosexuality in all Member 
States. Perhaps not surprisingly, no unanimity could not be reached, as at that moment, 
Ireland and Cyprus still had laws that criminalised same-sex intercourse by consenting 
adults. In the end, the decision was taken that “without wishing to comment on their 
content” the recommendation and resolution would be transmitted to the governments 
of member States.133 
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 It would be in their reply to the 1989 Assembly recommendation on “The 
conditions of transsexuals” that the Committee of Ministers was able to reach a 
conclusion that was more than just procedural, although it took them several years to 
come up with the reply. It expressed “its awareness of the serious problems faced by 
transsexuals, who are often victims of discrimination.”134 In 2000, it reacted on a more 
general Recommendation by the Assembly on “the situation of gays and lesbians in the 
Council of Europe Member States.» The Ministers acknowledged the problem, but 
rejected all the concrete proposals by the Assembly, which proposed inter alia to create 
a fulltime position within the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights with special 
responsibility for LGBT discrimination and extend the terms of reference of the 
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI).  
 In addition to the Assembly’s recommendations, LGBT issues were increasingly 
raised in written questions to the Committee on individual governments’ conduct. When 
local authorities in the Moldovan capital Chisinau banned the so-called “Pride Festival” 
in 2007, Swedish MP Acketoft asked the Committee whether it agreed that the decision 
made by the local authorities in Chisinau infringed Article 11 of the Convention on 
Human Rights.135 The Committee responded by stressing that “the Council of Europe’s 
message of tolerance and non-discrimination is meant to materialise in all European 
societies, and discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation is not compatible with the 
value of tolerance and the principle of equality, to which all the member states are 
bound.”136 
An historic step was the Recommendation137 that was adopted on 31 March 2010 
by the Committee of Ministers on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation or gender identity. Under Swedish Chairmanship, the Steering 
Committee for Human Rights (CDDH)138 was charged with drafting a “recommendation 
on measures to combat discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender  
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identity, to ensure respect for the human rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender 
persons and to promote tolerance towards them.”139 The CDDH in turn tasked a 
committee of experts to come up with a first draft. In the expert committee several 
NGO’s (e.g. Amnesty International, ILGA-Europe) were also allowed to participate as 
observer. Conservative NGO’s also noted these new developments. The Christian 
Telegraph for example wrote that the Council was to “debate forced acceptance of 
homosexual ideology.”140  
Hailed as the world’s first comprehensive intergovernmental agreement on LGBT 
rights, it is the Committee’s strongest and clearest stance on LGBT rights to date in the 
Council’s history.  It addresses LGBT discrimination in inter alia employment, education, 
housing, health and asylum, and encourages States to adopt national legislation to 
combat hate speech and guarantee freedom of association and expression. Legal 
provisions that try to restrict these rights on the grounds of public health, public 
morality or public order should be prevented.141 The recommendation can be seen as a 
soft law instrument, meaning that it is not legally binding and that its implementation 
cannot be enforced. Still, it carries considerable political and moral weight, as all 
Member States theoretically have agreed with its content.  
Although adopted by the Committee as a whole, and therefore by all 47 Member 
States, Russia’s internal opposition and their efforts to water down the final text are 
mentioned by several insiders. It argued that the final text subverted the European 
Court judgments and that it encouraged discrimination against the traditional family.142 
Some interviewees have mentioned the fact that Russia has made an internal 
reservation to the text, although it did not want to block the adoption of the 
recommendation as a whole. As the minutes of the Committee of Ministers meetings will 
only be made public thirty years from now, it is impossible to ascertain whether that is 
true. It is possible that they invoked the informal Gentleman’s Agreement from 1994 in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Europe and improving the effectiveness of the control mechanism established by the European Convention on 
Human Rights (http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cddh/). 
139
 Meeting of the Minister’s Deputies 1031
st
 meeting, 2 July 2008, Decision No. CM/876/02072008, “Ad hoc 
terms of reference for the Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH)” 
140
 “Europe to debate forced acceptance of homosexual ideology”, Christian Telegraph, 20 November 2009 
(http://www.christiantelegraph.com/issue7696.html) 
141
 Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on measures to combat 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity. 
142
 Interview NGO representative, 17 May 2013 
- 52 - 
 
which the Committee decided not to apply the strict unanimity rule to 
recommendations. It is however an informal agreement, meaning that formally the 
unanimity rule applies and thus can be invoked.143 
In order to ensure the implementation of the recommendation, the Committee of 
Ministers instructed the CDDH in September 2012 to examine the implementation in all 
Member States. The way in which this would done met however with opposition, in 
particular from Russia who managed to exclude NGO contributions  from the assessment 
report. The subsequent attempt by Russia and Bulgaria to block the approval of the 
questionnaire failed, and the questionnaire was therefore sent out to all 47 Member 
States. On 13 March a draft report was published which concluded that twenty states 
judged their implementation as “adequate”. Six states answered “fully satisfactory”, six 
other states described it as “insufficient”144 and one state as “absent”.145 Russia, Bulgaria, 
Ukraine, Azerbaijan Iceland, Luxembourg, Monaco and San Marino did not reply to the 
questionnaire. The report did indeed exclude contributions from NGO’s, but mentioned 
as a compromise that “spontaneous contributions submitted by Amnesty International, 
ILGA Europe and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (...) are accessible 
online” at the Council of Europe’s website.146 With the financial support of the Dutch 
Government’s Department for Gender & LGBT Emancipation of the Ministry of 
Education, Culture and Science, ILGA-Europe published its own report, in which it 
concluded that in general there had been little progress. Indeed, “in some of the 
countries reviewed steps are being taken which directly contravene its provisions”, 
citing Russia and Ukraine as the prime examples.147 
Aware of the political sensitivity, the CHHD draft report cautiously concludes that 
the Committee of Ministers “could take action in order to mainstream LGBT issues in all 
the areas of activity of the Council of Europe, possibly by setting up a long-term action 
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plan.”148 It remains to be seen whether all Member States will agree to that later this 
year. Recent developments however are not encouraging. In the past years, the laws 
introduced in Ukraine and Russia to curb so-called propaganda of homosexuality among 
minors have caused unease with other Member States and within the Council itself. 
When the current LGBT rapporteur Haugli asked questions in 2012 about regional laws 
introduced within Russia that prohibited “propaganda of sodomy, lesbianism, 
bisexualism, transgenderism amongst minors”149, the Committee of Ministers replied 
that “owing to a lack of consensus it has not been possible to adopt a reply.”150 According 
to Mr Haugli, “there are a few countries that decline to support any resolutions 
mentioning (in a positive way) LGBTs. Since the Committee of Ministers can only reach 
decisions when unanimous, one country alone can block resolutions that all others 
support.”151 This is a clear indication that LGBT issues are still surrounded with political 
sensitivity and that its full inclusion in the human rights acquis of the Council of Europe 
is far from achieved. 
3. Membership attitudes 
As the Committee of Ministers’ minutes are not public, it is not always easy to 
ascertain the exact stance that countries take when it comes to LGBT rights within the 
Council of Europe. Still, several observations can be made. 
First of all, none of the Member States criminalise homosexuality, setting it apart 
from both the United Nations and the OSCE. The Parliamentary Assembly, which is 
consulted by the Committee of Ministers before new members are admitted, for example 
required states like Romania, Armenia and Azerbaijan to change their Criminal Codes 
and decriminalise homosexuality. This didn’t always happen immediately. Romania for 
example joined the Council in 1993, but only decriminalised homosexuality three years 
later (ILGA, 2013: 21). For a long time however, several Member States had criminal 
laws which made homosexual acts illegal. Northern Ireland for example had maintained 
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a law – already abolished in England and Wales – which criminalized same-sex activities. 
In 1981, the European Court struck down this law, with the result that in 1982 
homosexuality was decriminalized in all of the United Kingdom.152 Ireland, also a 
founding member of the Council, only decriminalized homosexuality in 1993, after the 
European Court of Human Rights had ruled that penal sanctions were not justified when 
consenting adults were involved.153 Cyprus, admitted as member in 1961, had a similar 
provision in its criminal code until 1998. 154 
Although none of the Member States has national legislation criminalizing 
homosexuality, there remains one small jurisdiction within the Council of Europe’s 
territory which still does: Northern Cyprus. Since the Turkish invasion in 1974, an old 
law dating back to British colonial times is still in place, although since a European Court 
ruling in 1993 the same law has been repealed in the rest of Cyprus. Article 171 of the 
Northern Cyprus Criminal Code penalises “carnal knowledge of any person against the 
order of nature” with up to three years imprisonment. In October 2011 Parliamentary 
Assembly member Haugli (who would later be appointed LGBT rapporteur) raised the 
issue with the Committee of Ministers, asking whether the Committee would request 
“Turkey, as the Council of Europe member state responsible for the Northern part of 
Cyprus, to ensure the early repeal of Article 171 of the Criminal Code in that 
territory.”155 In June 2012 the Ministers replied that “owing to a lack of consensus it has 
not been possible to adopt a reply.”156 Currently a case is pending before the Court 
against Turkey to have this legal provision declared as violating the European 
Convention.157 
The second observation is that 27 (and soon 28) Member States of the Council of 
Europe are also Member States of the European Union. Several others are candidate 
countries and are therefore in the process of adapting and reviewing their legislation to 
bring it in line with European rules and legislation. As discrimination based on sexual 
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orientation or gender identity is expressly prohibited by the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU158, most of the (aspiring) EU Member States actively promote that LGBT 
rights be an integral part of the Council of Europe’s focus. 
The third observation is that the Holy See is “just” an Observer State at the 
Council of Europe. Contrary to the OSCE therefore it is not able to block 
recommendations or decisions that include references to sexual orientation or gender 
identity. This doesn’t mean that it cannot exert influence behind the scenes, in particular 
by lobbying other delegations. In several Member States the Catholic Church still has a 
powerful presence and is therefore listened to, in particular when family-related issues 
are discussed. A 1996 report noted that maintaining the traditional family structure and 
fighting “homosexual unions” is a high priority for the Vatican in Europe, and claimed 
that “while supporters of the Vatican line on family and gender often are thwarted in the 
European Parliament, Rome has had considerably more success in the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe.”159  The Holy See was entitled to participate in the 
Expert Committee which prepared the draft recommendation adopted in 2010. An NGO 
participant recalls that instead of sending one of its regular diplomatic staff members, 
the Holy See appointed a member of European Center for Law and Justice160, a 
conservative American organisation as its delegate.161 
Finally, although inclusion of sexual orientation and gender identity in the 
Council’s policies has proven to be less controversial than at the OSCE, there is still a 
small group of countries that is either reluctant or hostile towards it. According to 
former and current Council of Europe staff members, Russia, and to a lesser extent 
Bulgaria, are most vocal about their resistance to including sexual orientation and 
gender identity into the Council of Europe’s human rights standards.162 
Although Russia decriminalised homosexuality in 1993, prejudice and 
intolerance towards LGBT persons still runs deep in Russian society. In 2013, a poll by 
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the Levada Center showed that only 12 percent of Russians consider homosexuality as 
normal sexual behaviour fully equal to heterosexual relations.163 The crucial role played 
by the Russian Orthodox Church should not be underestimated. In a speech in 2007 
before the Parliamentary Assembly Patriarch Alexy called homosexuality a sin and a 
“distortion of the human personality like kleptomania.” Secretary General Davis later 
called it an “unfortunate analogy”, although the President of the Assembly, René van de 
Linden, praised his commitment to peace and mutual respect. 164 At a meeting in May 
2013, Patriarch Kirill told Secretary-General Jagland that same-sex marriage is sinful, 
adding that “"if people choose such lifestyle, this is their right but the Church's 
responsibility is to say that this is a sin in the face of God.”165  
In 2012 Russia blocked the adoption of the final declaration at the 9th Council of 
Europe Conference of Ministers responsible for youth in held in St. Petersburg. 
According to the Russian deputy Minister of Education and Science, other countries’ 
representatives unexpectedly amended the document by adding an item referring to the 
requirement to combat discrimination and violation of rights of LGBT youth.166 In 
addition, she argued that LGBT people “are not discriminated against and have all the 
rights as other citizens, and inclusion of such a special item in the resolution would in 
effect constitute propaganda of homosexuality, bisexuality and transgenderness.”167  
Similar attitudes can also be found in other Member States. In 2012, Father 
Evgeni Yanakiev of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church called to oppose a Gay Pride planned 
in Sofia, arguing that “throwing stones at gays is an appropriate way.”168 The importance 
of personal attitudes within the diplomatic corps should not be underestimated either. 
Several interviewees mentioned the homophobic views of the Bulgarian Permanent 
Representative in Strasbourg. In 2010, two Azerbaijani MP’s refused to take part in a 
debate at the Parliamentary Assembly about LGBT discrimination. Mr  Hajiyev stated 
that “I am not going to take part in these discussions and I think it wrong to raise this 
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issue in PACE.”169 In 2012, the Albanian Deputy Defense Minister was asked his opinion 
about a Gay Pride to be held in the capital Tirana. In his opinion, “what remains to be 
done is to beat them up with a stick. If you don’t understand this, I can explain it: to beat 
them with a rubber stick.”170 Interestingly, Albania is one of the partner states in the 
current Council of Europe LGBT Project. The current Prime Minister seems to be co-
operative with the project and even has said he would be in favour of a Gay Pride being 
held in the Albanian capital.171 
Turkey equally is dismissive when it comes to LGBT rights. In 2008, Turkey’s 
leading gay organization Lambda Istanbul was banned by Istanbul’s Governor, because 
it allegedly violated Turkey’s “law and morals.”172 The ban led to sharp criticism from 
the President of the Council’s Parliamentary Assembly. In February 2013 the Turkish 
army announced that any soldier who would come out as gay would be expelled from 
the army, thereby wilfully ignoring objections expressed by both the European 
Commission and the Parliamentary Assembly.173 Prime Minster Erdogan in March 2013 
said that homosexuality conflicted with the “culture of Islam”.174  
Interestingly, Turkish diplomats keep a low profile when it comes to LGBT issues 
at the Council of Europe. From time to time they will indicate their opposition, but it 
doesn’t translate into an outright diplomatic offensive. Most of the Turkish diplomats 
are raised in the secular Kemalist tradition in which politics and religion are strictly 
separated. Still, in 2010 a Turkish minister objected to an article in a Council of Europe 
declaration on children’s rights alluding to gay marriage, arguing that “we do not accept 
gay marriages and also we do not accept the institution of homosexual family 
parenting.”175 The article was subsequently adapted to accommodate the Turkish 
objections. 
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4. Leadership 
Although the first judgment of the European Court of Human Rights condemning 
the criminalisation of homosexuality dates back to 1981176, it took a long time before 
people in leadership positions within the Council of Europe started speaking out in 
favour of LGBT rights. 
Secretary-General 
Apart from leading the Secretariat and submitting the annual budget for adoption 
to the Committee of Ministers177, the Secretary General’s role is not clearly defined. 
Before the post of Commissioner for Human Rights was created in 1999, one could say 
that he was Europe’s top human rights official. Although the candidates are put forward 
by the Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly in the end appoints the 
Secretary –General. The appointment process is usually opaque and part of a broader 
political deal in which political affiliation, national background and professional 
qualification are all part of the equation. In 1999, the leading candidate for the position 
Walter Schwimmer, an Austrian MP, caused controversy with his conservative stance on 
homosexuality. Several NGO’s pointed to the fact that his voting record in the area of 
LGBT rights was questionable178, and started a nine month campaign to lobby national 
governments and Parliamentary Assembly members to vote against this “homophobe”. 
179 Secretary-general of Austria's national lesbian and gay organisation Kurt Krickler 
commented that "the Austrian government, which put forward Walter Schwimmer as 
candidate, has been acutely embarrassed. Never again, we believe, will a European 
government propose a candidate for such a position in the belief that lesbian and gay 
rights can safely be ignored.”180 In the end, Schwimmer was elected on 23 June by a very 
narrow margin of two votes over United Kingdom candidate Terry Davis, who would 
become his successor in 2004.  
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Terry Davis on the contrary was more vocal in his support for gay rights in all the 
Council’s Member States. In a speech before the Council’s Congress of Local and Regional 
Authorities he denounced the refusal by some local authorities to authorise public 
gatherings of gay and lesbian people, arguing that sometimes “the motive for the refusal 
is prejudice and the decision is discriminatory”.181 On the occasion of the 2007 
International Day Against Homophobia, he published an opinion article in which he 
strongly spoke out against the increasing homophobia in Europe, calling to “end the 
hypocrisy of silence and stop treating homophobic attitudes as a cultural eccentricity. It 
is time to apologise for the past and act for the future. It is time for Europe to say clearly 
and with force – no longer and never again!”182 
 Current Secretary-General Thorbjørn Jagland has equally assumed a leadership 
role in advocating LGBT rights, sometimes explicitly targeting specific Member States. In 
a statement marking International Human Rights Day in 2011, he condemned 
“discriminatory laws” adopted in Lithuania, Ukraine and Russia, deploring the fact that 
“prejudice and hypocrisy still exist towards LGBT persons in Europe.”183 During a visit to 
Moscow he called on the authorities to allow gay prides so that “LGBT people can 
express their views and (hold) demonstrations.”184 
Commissioner for Human Rights 
The post of Commissioner for Human Rights was created in 1999 as the Council 
of Europe’s “non-judicial institution to promote education in, awareness of and respect 
for human rights, as embodied in the human rights instruments of the Council of 
Europe.”185His main role is to create awareness of human rights (violations) within 
Member States through statements, country visits and reports. Under the Convention, 
States are also allowed to bring cases against other States, but this provision is seldom 
used, mainly because of the politically sensitive nature that these cases would have. In 
that sense, as an independent person of “high moral character having recognised 
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expertise in the field of human rights, a public record of attachment to the values of the 
Council of Europe and the personal authority necessary to discharge the mission of the 
Commissioner effectively”186, the Commissioner fulfils a deficit in the Convention’s 
human rights system (Schlüter, 2006: 53). However, he should not duplicate the 
activities of the Council and the Court and he is not allowed to take up individual 
complaints. These limitations led the first Commissioner Alvaro Gil-Robles to wonder 
“what the strict application of these criteria would actually have left.» In his opinion, it 
reveals “all the distrust of the established towards the unknown and the desire to orient 
the Commissioner towards a promotional role.”187  
During his mandate from 1999 – 2006, Mr Gil-Robles occasionally paid attention 
to LGBT rights, in particular during his country visits. On his visit to Slovenia in 2003 for 
example, he expressed his concern to learn that “to learn that homophobic statements 
were frequently published in the media.”188 The attention paid to LGBT issues in his 
Annual Reports however is not systematic. Only his second (2001), third (2002) and 
final (2006) report mention them. It was under his successor, the Swede Thomas 
Hammarberg, that LGBT rights became one of nine thematic priorities.189  Where 
Commissioner Gil-Robles spoke of the homosexual community, Hammarberg from the 
outset used the more encompassing term of LGBT rights. In 2007, it was announced that 
the Office was able to strengthen its capacity to monitor the human rights situation of 
LGBT persons with the help of a voluntary contribution from the government of the 
Netherlands.190 In 2008 he delivered the key note address at a conference of the 
International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA) and published a special Viewpoint in 
which he denounced the existing prejudices, adding that “advocacy against homophobia 
is clearly not opportune in a number of countries.”191 In 2009 Mr Hammarberg issued an 
Issue Paper on gender identity and human rights, and in 2011 a comprehensive report 
on “Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe” was 
launched. Mr Hammarberg’s outspoken commitment to LGBT rights was largely the 
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result of his country visits, during which he “found that the discrimination of LGBT 
persons was very, very widespread and deep. People were scared and open discussion 
was a taboo. (...) In other words, we had here a serious human rights problem”.192 
Under the current Commissioner Nils Muižnieks (Latvia) who took office in April 
2012, LGBT rights are no longer mentioned as a priority, but still feature as a “central 
theme”.193  In October 2012 he published a web-item “How long must LGBTI persons 
still wait to live free from prejudice?” in which he targeted inter alia the legislation 
criminalising the “promotion of homosexuality” in some Member States.194 
Chairmanship 
The rotating Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers offers the opportunity 
to set the agenda for 6 months. It was no coincidence that under Swedish leadership in 
2008 the Steering Committee for Human Rights – a sort of working group of the 
Committee of Ministers – was charged with drafting the 2010 Recommendation on 
sexual orientation and gender identity.195 In its priorities for the Chairmanship, Sweden 
had already announced that it would “seek to encourage further action by the Council of 
Europe against discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. Close contacts with all 
parts of the Council of Europe, including the Commissioner for Human Rights, should be 
maintained on this issue”. The United Kingdom equally included LGBT rights in the 
priorities for its Chairmanship from November 2011 – May 2012. It pledged to “work to 
maintain the momentum generated by the Council of Europe recommendation on 
measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender 
identity”.196 In March 2012, the UK organized a conference entitled “Combating 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity across Europe:  
sharing knowledge and moving forward”, the first time in the history of the Council of 
Europe that the Chairmanship had organized a special event on LGBT issues.197 The 
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Chairmanship’s room for manoeuvre however is dependent upon the political will of 
other Member States.  
5. NGO Participation 
NGO’s play a much more important role at the Council of Europe than at the 
OSCE. Already in 1952 the organisation introduced the possibility for NGO’s to obtain so-
called consultative status, and in 2005 they together form the Conference of INGO’s of 
the Council of Europe. In practice, this means that NGO’s may contribute to the work of 
intergovernmental committees, prepare memoranda for the Secretary General, make 
oral or written statements to the committees of the Parliamentary Assembly and the 
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities and address seminars and other meetings 
organised by the Council of Europe.198  
The activity of NGO’s advocating gay rights has played a pivotal role in putting 
LGBT rights on the Council of Europe’s agenda. ILGA-Europe (the European branch of 
the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association) deserves 
special mention here. At first its consultative status was rejected because their activities 
were not "directly related to the present work programme of the Council of Europe”199. 
This changed in 1998, when Secretary-General Tarschys judged that “the organisation 
has a specific contribution to make to any discussion on discrimination generally as well 
as on more specific issues such as discrimination against people with HIV and AIDS.»200 
ILGA-Europe made use of various channels within the Council structures. Several 
ILGA members supported test cases to the European Court and the organisation 
influenced the admission policy for new members so that their entry into the Council 
would be made conditional upon the decriminalisation of homosexuality. But the 
Parliamentary Assembly has proven to be the most accessible forum for ILGA-Europe to 
exert influence. Questions asked by Assembly members to the Committee of Ministers 
are sometimes the result of successful lobbying by ILGA-representatives. Their expertise 
and their extended network make them a valuable source of information and analysis 
when it comes to the situation of LGBT persons in all 47 Member States. According to 
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former Commissioner for Human Rights Hammarberg, it is thanks to “the enormous and 
skilful work of ILGA-Europe” that the situation of LGBT persons in Europe has improved 
in the last years.201  
However, conservative NGO’s, sometimes linked to the Vatican or evangelical 
groups in the United States, try to raise their voice as well. It is hard to measure their 
influence and success, but the fact that they rely more on principled statements and 
oppose most of the Court’s rulings on LGBT equality gives them a more marginalised 
position than for example ILGA-Europe. Whereas ILGA has regular meetings with the 
Commissioner for Human Rights and participated in the drafting process of the 2010 
Recommendation, more conservative or outright homophobic NGO’s have to rely on 
oppositional tactics to make their voice heard within the Council’s complex institutional 
architecture. 
As mentioned before, the European Centre for Law and Justice is one of the 
conservative NGO’s trying to defend traditional family values. In their comments on the 
report by Assembly rapporteur Gross they argued that LGBT people do not have any 
special or specific fundamental rights. In their view, “it appears more and more clearly 
that the concepts of “hate speech” and “homophobia” are modern tools for censorship 
and, at least, for the imposition of a compulsory morality.”202 
In March 2013 two Russian NGO’s (the ‘Family and Demography Foundation’ and 
the ‘Interregional Public Organisation “For Family Rights”’) argued in a written 
communication to the Committee of Ministers that Russian laws prohibiting propaganda 
of homosexuality to minors do not contradict the Court’s judgement on Alekseyev v. 
Russia (2010). “Homosexual lifestyle” would be linked to increased health risks, 
propaganda of homosexuality would contradict Russia’s concept of morals and that the 
Court in its rulings has overstepped its mandate.203 
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6. Bureaucratic Structures  
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) 
The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) was created in 
1993 by the first Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe 
with as main task the combating of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, anti-
Semitism and intolerance in Europe. Its 47 experts from all Member States review 
national legislation and subsequently formulate general policy recommendations.204 The 
Commission is independent, but answerable to the Committee of Ministers which – 
crucially – determines the scope of its mandate. 
For a long term the Commission held that ‘intolerance’ as used in the terms of 
reference “does not encompass other forms of intolerance such as homophobia, sexism 
or intolerance towards disabled people, which are not part of its mandate.”205 In 2000, 
the Parliamentary Assembly recommended that the Committee of Ministers extend the 
terms of reference of ECRI to also cover homophobia.206 Turkey objected however, 
arguing that “intolerance, discrimination and violence directed to these groups deserve 
due attention. Nevertheless, we believe that this issue, though important in itself, again 
falls outside ECRI’s mandate.”207 Although the country reports did include sections like 
‘vulnerable/target groups’ in which it deals with Muslim communities, gypsies, refugees 
and migrants, LGBT persons were indeed completely absent.  
In 2010 Secretary-General Jagland invited ECRI to also consider working on LGBT 
issues. Although ECRI agreed in principle, the Russian delegation opposed the plans. 
When ECRI again indicated its willingness to work on LGBT issues in 2012, Russia again 
tried to block it but found itself isolated within the Committee of Ministers.208 In its 
                                                          
204
 Appendix to Resolution (2002)8 Statute of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), 
Article 1 
205
 “Combating Intolerance and Racism”, an Introduction to the work of the European Commission against 
Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), April 2009 
(http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/activities/Ecri_work_en.pdf) 
206
 Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1474 (2000), “Situation of gays and lesbians in Council of Europe 
Member States” 
207
 Ministers' Deputies Records CM/Del/Act(2001)751, 22 May 2001 
208
 Interview by the author with NGO representative, 17 may 2013 
- 65 - 
 
country visit in March 2013 to Germany, ECRI included “LGBT questions” for the first 
time in their information gathering in preparation of their monitoring report.209 
 
Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights 
The Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights is independent from the 
Secretariat and does not report to the Secretary-General.210 The Commissioner is 
therefore free to organise his Office as he sees fit. Within the Office, one of his Senior 
Advisers is responsible for all the thematic work related to LGBT issues, although this 
only takes up part of his work. A major step was the launch in 2009 of the largest study 
ever made on homophobia, transphobia and discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation and gender identity in the 47 Member States. According to Commissioner 
Hammarberg, who took the initiative, the report was necessary “in order to have facts 
and a deeper analysis available for his ongoing dialogue with authorities on this 
topic”.211 In 2011 the report “Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and 
gender identity in Europe” was published, thanks to the financial support of Finland, 
Flanders, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom.212 
LGBT Unit 
In October 2011, Secretary-General Jagland took the initiative to create the so-
called LGBT Issues Unit, falling under the Directorate of Human Rights and Anti-
discrimination. Described by the Secretary-General as “the first-ever structure of its kind 
in an international intergovernmental institution”213, its tasks are to implement 
Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5, to organise and support relevant conferences and 
activities, document relevant developments and be the home of the Council of Europe 
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LGBT Project.214 This so-called LGBT Project takes up most of the Unit’s time and effort. 
Interestingly, the project did not originate within the Council itself but with several 
Member States who wanted to ensure that the 2010 recommendation would not remain 
a dead letter. As a result, currently 6 partner Member States receive funding for efforts 
to develop a cross-sectoral LGBT policy, strengthen human rights for LGBT people and 
combat discrimination.215 The overall and long-term goal of the project is to “contribute 
to the improvement of the quality of life among LGBT people in Europe”.216 The project 
is funded by voluntary contributions from Belgium, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United-Kingdom and runs from September 2011 
until the end of 2013. The partner countries, who voluntarily came forward to 
participate, are Poland, Italy, Latvia, Albania, Montenegro and Serbia – conveniently 
three EU and three non-EU countries.217 The inclusion of Italy, a relatively rich Western 
European country, has raised some eyebrows with the donor countries, but overall the 
project is characterised as a success.  
The LGBT Issues Unit itself describes their work and project as a “success”, in 
particular because of the co-operation that it established between civil society, 
governments and the Council. But the discussion will now be whether to continue the 
Unit after 2013, a decision to be taken by the Secretary-General. It is hard to envisage a 
scenario in which the Unit would completely disappear, as there is no other bureaucratic 
structure within the Council which is completely devoted to LGBT issues. In addition, 
once bureaucratic structures are created, they tend to persist.  The continuation of the 
(technically separate) project is up to individual Member States and the funds made 
available by them. 
Parliamentary Assembly 
Within the Council’s institutional architecture, it is the Parliamentary Assembly 
who has the role of agenda-setter. The original Statute from 1949 called it a 
“Consultative Assembly”, accurately reflecting its limited role of advising and 
recommending. The only exception is the election of the judges of the European Court of 
Human Rights, Commissioner for Human Rights, as well as the Secretary General of the 
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Council of Europe. As we saw earlier, Walter Schwimmer almost lost his election as 
Secretary General in 1999, as criticism grew about his conservative views on 
homosexuality. 
The Assembly’s advising role is manifested in three types of texts that it adopts: 
recommendations, resolutions and opinions. They mainly serve as guidelines for the 
Committee of Ministers, national governments, parliaments and political parties.218 As 
regards LGBT rights, the Assembly indeed played the role of agenda-setter. As early as 
1981 it adopted a recommendation, at the initiative of Dutch MP Voogd, urging Member 
States to abolish laws criminalising homosexuality and apply the same minimum age of 
consent for homosexual and heterosexual acts.219 Although the recommendation was 
met with a lot of support, some delegates were outright hostile to it. Mr Margue 
(Luxembourg) argued that “the real reason why there is discrimination against 
homosexuals is that they bring it on themselves by behaving in a way which our parents, 
who still had some common sense, rightly said was unnatural.” 220 Mr Cavaliere (Italy) 
added that “to my mind homosexuality is deviant, beyond the bounds of normality. (...) 
The Council of Europe could be making a very serious mistake.”221 
 In 1989 a recommendation on the conditions of transsexuals followed, and in 
2000 another recommendation was adopted on the situation of gays and lesbians in 
Council of Europe Member States, calling inter alia registered partnerships and 
measures to combat homophobic attitudes at school and in sport. Support for the 2000 
recommendation was overwhelming, with only a few dissenting voices. Polish MP 
Libicki for example commented on the recommendation that it was “a step not towards 
equal rights for homosexuals but towards social conflict and political demands for more 
and more homosexual rights, which are already unacceptable enough.”222 
 LGBT issues are also raised in debates or in the Assembly's Equality and Non-
Discrimination Committee, which recently also conducting a hearing on the rights of 
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LGBT people. In 2005, Swiss MP Andreas Goss was appointed rapporteur on the issue of 
“Legal recognition of same-sex partnerships in Europe” and in 2008 his mandate was 
broadened to discrimination of LGBT persons in general. In 2010 his report was 
presented, and the Assembly subsequently adopted Resolution 1728 in which it inter 
alia condemned homophobia transphobia and hate speech by political and religious 
leaders.  
According to the current PACE rapporteur on the rights of LGBT people Håkon 
Haugli (Norway), the Parliamentary Assembly “can play a very important role – in 
setting standards, highlighting best-practice, challenging politicians to take active roles 
in their national parliaments, etc. - but it remains to be seen whether it will. When the 
Assembly last debated LGBT issues in 2010, none of the “homo-propaganda”-laws were 
on the table as the assembly only discussed the (broader) issue of discrimination.”223 In 
the end, even agenda-setting has its limits. 
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7. Analysis 
 Two main conclusions can be drawn from the three case studies. The first is that 
on the intergovernmental side, LGBT issues to differing degrees remain a controversial 
and sensitive topic. The other one is that this has not prevented the international 
organisations from developing policies in this area. Let us take a closer look by going 
back to our hypotheses. 
HYPOTHESIS 1 
The promotion of LGBT rights as part of an international organisation’s policies is partly 
the result of the organisation’s autonomous behaviour. 
HYPOTHESIS 2 
The extent of the international organisation’s autonomous behaviour in the promotion of 
LGBT rights is greater when decision-making is done by majority voting instead of by 
consensus. 
 Within the UN, one could say that the lack of a clear, unambiguous mandate to 
address LGBT discrimination has indeed made it one of the most neglected policy areas 
at the United Nations. There are conventions, committees and special rapporteurs on the 
rights of women, migrants, children and business and human rights, but none explicitly 
charged with LGBT rights. Although at the intergovernmental level there is some 
progress, as the increasing number of signatories to the General Assembly statement 
demonstrates, still more than a third of all UN Member States criminalise homosexuality, 
and in five homosexual acts are punishable with death penalty.  
But still, despite the lack of consensus, leading figures at the United Nations have 
spoken out in strong terms against the discrimination of LGBT people. Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-moon’s pledge that he would lead a global campaign against homophobic 
violence and discrimination is more than remarkable in this regard. But the engagement 
of the successive High Commissioners must also be recalled. One of them, Mary 
Robinson, even had been a gay rights activist in her younger years when she 
campaigned against the criminalisation of homosexuality in Ireland. Usually, these 
leading figures rely on the UN human rights jurisprudence as elaborated by the various 
expert and judicial bodies. However, not all Member States have accepted their 
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jurisdiction, and the fact that their views are now used as a tool for global advocacy in 
name of the United Nations might be problematic for some.  
When Kofi Annan, after his retirement as Secretary-General, was asked about the 
advancement of gay rights at the United Nations, he remarked that “this is how the UN 
works. It starts at very low ebb, and it keeps going until other countries team up. And 
the debate, the discussion itself is educational. The further we discuss it, the more 
people are going home and reporting back; it prepares the ground for the next round, 
when one hopes you would get the majority of countries for it.”224 Giving the global 
movement for the advancement of LGBT rights the powerful seal of approval of the 
United Nations is a clear demonstration of a degree of autonomy exercised by an 
international organisation. 
At the Council of Europe, much has happened at in the past years in the area of 
LGBT rights, despite reluctance from some (influential) Member States. This is quite 
remarkable, considering the fact that decision-making within the organisation is based 
on unanimity. As at the UN, both the Secretary-General and the Commissioner for 
Human Rights have spoken out in clear terms in favour of LGBT rights. The creation of 
the so-called LGBT Unit was a decision made by the Secretary-General himself, as was 
his invitation to the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) to 
consider LGBT issues in their work. Commissioner for Human Rights Hammarberg was 
particularly vocal in its fight against discrimination against people based on their sexual 
orientation or gender identity. 
At the OSCE, the lack of a clear mandate and the subsequent ambivalent approach 
towards LGBT rights is a reflection not only of the sensitive nature of the issue, but is 
also telling of the effectiveness of the diplomacy of the more progressive States (Swiebel 
and Van der Veur, 2009: 19). But the fact that the OSCE, despite the politicised nature of 
the LGBT debate, the consensus principle and the lack of a formal mandate, has been 
able to take some small steps in this area is remarkable. With two Participating States 
still criminalising homosexuality and several other States categorically opposed to the 
inclusion of sexual orientation as part of the anti-discrimination commitments, it is 
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surprising that within the OSCE itself LGBT issues have become part of the agenda, albeit 
in a rather limited way. As former ODIHR Director Strohal acknowledges now, “we were 
probably doing better than one could have expected”.225 Under his leadership, ODIHR 
decided on its own to start including homophobia in its work on hate speech and in its 
Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Information System. In addition, Mr Strohal 
mentioned homophobia regularly in his speeches and meetings with national 
governments. 
On the other hand, one could say that it is equally surprising that within an 
international organisation that bears “Europe” in its name, LGBT issues are much more 
invisible than for example at the more diverse United Nations. If the OSCE is indeed not 
much more than a talking shop (Van Ham, 2001: 404), it is surprising that even talking 
about LGBT rights seems to be a taboo. The OSCE’s allegedly “very flexible and dynamic 
norm-creating process in the human rights field”226 seems to be increasingly subject to a 
politicised debate about its scope, relevance and even raison d’être. If the OSCE is a 
community of values, why then are human rights its bone of contention? If it is an 
Organisation that primarily deals with European security, why then did Mongolia join 
the OSCE in November 2012? According to Christian Strohal, “the OSCE is a very 
conservative Organisation in many regards, in particular the way it is being managed 
from the governmental side”.227 Perhaps this reflects a more fundamental problem that 
“either the OSCE’s agenda has not been important enough to increase its relevance, or 
important issues have been taken over by other Organisations that can deal with them 
more effectively” (Dunay, 2005: 82). 
NGO’s have obviously played their part as well. Their contributions are used in all 
three organisations, albeit to differing degrees. The UN High Commissioner and the 
Council of Europe’s Commissioner have regularly met up with LGBT advocacy groups, 
and they have provided input to their reports and country visits. It is too early to tell 
how much influence the more conservative NGO’s will be able to exert in the process, 
but it seems they already have lost the battle. Their oppositional tactics however will 
give them some influence over national delegations that also oppose the concepts of 
sexual orientation and gender identity. 
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When decision-making is done by majority voting, as is the case within the UN, 
then resolutions condemning LGBT discrimination are more likely to pass, giving the 
Secretariat “cover” to also include them in their policies. When rulers of unanimity or 
consensus apply, agreement is harder to reach, and the Secretariat has to be more 
careful in its work. The OSCE is the case in point here, where ODIHR in particular had to 
deal very carefully with this sensitive. So indeed, majority voting seems to give more 
room for manoeuvre within an international organisation. 
LEGITIMACY 
 The last question that has to be addressed is that of legitimacy. Have we seen 
instances of what Barnett and Finnemore call undemocratic liberalism in global 
governance? Two perspectives are possible. Some people would answer this question 
with a definite ‘yes’. International organisations clearly seem biased towards the global 
gay rights movement, ignoring the more conservative NGO’s and movements who do not 
accept the concepts of ‘sexual orientation and ‘gender identity’. Almost all people in 
leadership positions within the international organisations come from the West and 
have had their education in the West. At the Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, more than half of the staff comes from European countries, and most of 
their work on LGBT rights is funded by Norway. At the Council of Europe, a special LGBT 
project is funded by 6 western countries. By making international organisations the 
mouthpiece of liberal ideologies, their independence and legitimacy is undermined. 
 The other perspective would say that it is Member States themselves that have 
endowed these organisations were rather ambiguous and broad human rights 
mandates, purposefully leaving room for interpretation. When the rights of a vulnerable 
minority group are trampled upon, they have a clear responsibility to act. Human rights 
are universal and apply to everyone all the time, also LGBT people. In this view, it is 
legitimate that international organisations elaborate LGBT policies, and even necessary. 
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Conclusion 
As Cynthia Enloe paraphrases in her book “Bananas, Beaches and Bases”, the 
personal is international. In September 2009, German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
appointed Guido Westerwelle as the world’s first openly gay foreign minister in history. 
Although someone’s sexual orientation would normally be a private affair, that was not 
entirely true for Mr Westerwelle. For example, the question arose how the 76 countries 
in the world where homosexuality is still illegal would deal with a visiting homosexual 
German foreign minister.  In 2010, he announced that at least his life partner would not 
accompany him on visits to any of these countries.228 However, Mr Westerwelle’s sexual 
orientation did not prevent him from visiting Iran in 2011, a country where homosexual 
act are still punishable with the death penalty. But in 2012 it caused a diplomatic 
incident between Germany and Belarus, after the Belarusian President Lukashenko had 
said that it was better to be a dictator than gay, clearly referring to Mr Westerwelle and 
his criticism on Belarus’ human rights record.229 
 LGBT issues have undeniably found their way into the realm of diplomacy and 
international relations. With more and more States legalising gay marriage (the United 
Kingdom most probably being the next one) and with a possibly groundbreaking ruling 
by the US Supreme Court on its way, more scholarly attention to this topic is warranted. 
Many perspectives are possible, as this thesis has shown. A feminist approach could be 
useful, although numerically women make up a far greater proportion of the population 
(around 50 %) than LGBT people (approx. 6 %) and are therefore much more visible. In 
addition, in countries where homosexuality is illegal LGBT people will remain a hidden 
minority, giving their leaders the opportunity to claim that sexual orientation is a 
Western concept that doesn’t apply to their country. But as this thesis has shown, they 
face increasing pressure, not only from national governments and transnational 
advocacy networks but also the international organisations they are members of. Only 
time will tell whether this pressure will yield lasting results. 
                                                          
228
 “Westerwelle won't take partner to anti-gay lands”, The Local, 11 August 2010 
(http://www.thelocal.de/politics/20100811-29089.html) 
229
 “Germany rejects gay jibe from Belarus leader Lukashenko”, BBC News, 5 March 2012 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17267426) 
- 74 - 
 
 
Literature 
Armstrong, David, Theo Farrell and Hélène Lambert (2007), International Law and 
International Relations. Cambridge: University Press 
Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore (2004), Rules for the World. International 
Organisations in Global Politics. New York: Cornell University 
Bloed, Arie, “Monitoring the Human Dimension of the OSCE”, in: Alfredsson, Gudmundur, 
Jonas Grimheden, Bertrand G. Ramcharan and Alfred Zayas (2009), International Human 
Rights Monitoring Mechanisms. Essays in Honour of Jacob Th. Möller. Leiden: Koninklijke 
Brill NV 
Bob, Clifford (2012), The Global Right Wing and the Clash of World Politics. Cambridge: 
University Press 
Buzan, Barry (2004), From International to World Society? English School Theory and the 
Social Structure of Globalisation. Cambridge: University Press 
Donnelly, Jack (1998), International Human Rights. Boulder: Westview Press 
Dunay, Pál (2005), The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe: constant 
adaptation but enduring problems, in: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI) Yearbook 2005 
Enloe, Cynthia (1989), Bananas, Beaches & Bases. Making Feminist Sense of International 
Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press 
Freeman, Michael (2002), Human Rights. An Interdisciplinary Approach. Cambridge: 
Polity Press 
Galbreath, David J. (2007), The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 
Abingdon: Routledge 
George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett (2005), Case Studies and Theory Development 
in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: MIT Press 
- 75 - 
 
Gheciu, Alexandra (2008), Securing Civilization? The EU, NATO and the OSCE in the Post-
9/11 World. Oxford: University Press 
Göksel , Diba Nihar (2013), Gay Rights: Where is Turkey Heading?, The German Marshall 
Fund of the United States 
Graupner, Helmut and Phillip Tahmindjis (2005), Sexuality and Human Rights. A Global 
Overview. Binghamton: Harrington Park Press 
ILGA (International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association) (2013), 
State-Sponsored Homophobia. A world survey of laws: criminalisation, protection and 
recognition of same-sex love. Report available online 
(http://old.ilga.org/Statehomophobia/ILGA_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_2013.pdf) 
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) (2009), Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and 
International Human Rights Law. Practitioners Guide No. 4. Geneva: ICJ 
Jaichand, Vinodh and Markku Suksi (eds.) (2009), 60 Years of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights in Europe. Antwerp: Intersentia 
Maldoon, Timothy, “Sexual Orientation Discrimination: A Necessary and Emerging Area 
of United Nations Concern”, in: Alfredsson, Gudmundur, Jonas Grimheden, Bertrand G. 
Ramcharan and Alfred Zayas (2009), International Human Rights Monitoring 
Mechanisms. Essays in Honour of Jacob Th. Möller. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV 
Mearsheimer, John J. (1994), “The False Promise of International Institutions”, 
International Security 19(3): 5-49 
Mertus, Julie (2005), The United Nations and Human Rights: A Guide for a New Era. Oxon: 
Routledge 
Mosser, Michael W., “Engineering Influence: The Subtle Power of Small States in the 
CSCE/OSCE”, in: Erich Reiter and Heinz Gärtner (eds.) (2001), Small States and Alliances. 
Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag 
Pollack, Mark A. (1997), “Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European 
Community”, International Organisation 51(1): 99-134 
- 76 - 
 
Pollack, Mark A. (2007), “Principal-Agent Analysis and International Delegation: Red 
Herrings, Theoretical Clarifications, and Empirical Disputes”, Cahier de Recherche 
politique de Bruges, no. 2, Collège d’Europe 
Pierson, Paul (2000), “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics”, 
The American Political Science Review 94(2): 251-267 
Pierson, Paul (2004), Politics in Time. History, Institutions and Social Analysis. Princeton: 
University Press 
Ramcharan, Bertie G., “The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights”, in: 
Alfredsson, Gudmundur, Jonas Grimheden, Bertrand G. Ramcharan and Alfred Zayas 
(2009), International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms. Essays in Honour of Jacob 
Th. Möller. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV 
Reus-Smit, Christian and Duncan Snidal (2008), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Relations. Oxford: University Press 
Schlüter, Karen, “The Council of Europe, the Standard-setter”, in: Brosig, Malte (ed.) 
(2006), Human Rights in Europe. A Fragmented Regime? Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang 
Swiebel, Joke (2009), “Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender human rights: the search 
for an international strategy”, Contemporary Politics 15(1): 19-35 
Swiebel, Joke and Dennis van der Veur (2009), “Hate Crimes against Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual and Transgender Persons and the Policy Response of International 
Governmental Organisations”, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 27(4): 485-524 
Van Ham, Peter (2001), “Security and Culture, or, Why NATO Won’t Last”, Security 
Dialogue 32: 393-406 
Waltz, Kenneth (1979), Theory of International Politics. New York: Random House 
